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INTRODUCTION
At 7:00 P.M., Friday, March 20, 1914, the War Office in 
Whitehall, London-, received the following telegram from the General 
Officer Commanding the Forces in Ireland, with Headquarters at the 
Royal Hospital, Dublin:
Officer Commanding 5th Lancers states that all officers 
except two, and one doubtful, are resigning commissions to­
day. I much fear the same conditions in the 16th Lancers.
Fear men will refuse to move.^
At 11:35 P.M. on the same day, this message, from the same source,
arrived at the War Office: "Regret to report Brigadier and 57
officers, 3rd Cavalry Brigade, prefer to accept dismissal if ordered 
2north." Just before midnxght, stxll Friday, March 20, the Secre­
tary of State for War dispatched this message to the General Officer 
Commanding in Ireland:
Your telegram with reference to 5th and 16th Lancers 
received. You have authority of Army Council to suspend 
from duty any senior officers who have tendered their 
resignations or in any other manner disputed your authority.
Take whatever action you think proper and report to the 
War Office.
Direct Gough and Officers Commanding 5th and 16th Lancers 
to report themselves to the Adjutant-General at the War 
Office. They should leave on the first possible boat.
They should be relieved of their commands and officers 
are being sent to relieve them at once.
Resignations of all officers should be refused.^
^Pall Mall Gazette (London), March 24, 1914, 4. 
2Ibid. ^Ibid.
1
2The exchange of the proceeding communications set off a 
politico-military crisis that has become known to students of British 
history as the "Curragh Incident." In a very limited sense, the
Curragh Incident--the refusal of a group of cavalry officers sta­
tioned in Ireland to accept orders from the War Office--began and 
ended during one tension-filled week in March, 1914. In a larger 
sense, the causes of the incident were rooted in the controversy 
over Home Rule for Ireland going back to the 1880’s and its effects 
carried on well into the period of World War I . The purpose of
this paper is to identify the causes and effects of the Curragh
Incident and to seek an historical lesson from the political and 
personal interactions surrounding the incident. The role of the 
military establishment as the servant of public policy in a liberal 
political regime will be a subject of special interest.
Background and issues comprise the first chapter. The Home 
Rule situation.is updated from the 1880’s to early 1914. The Con- 
servative and Unionist Party rancor over the Parliament Act of 1913. 
contributed to the weakening of the constitutional processes and 
so helped set the stage for the incident. Home Rule took on a par­
ticularly ominous cast with the formation of a provisional government 
and the organization of para-military groups in Ulster. Many British 
army officers, intensely conservative in both heritage and conviction, 
felt antagonistic toward the Liberal government policy in Ulster.
By early 1914, civil war threatened in Ireland.
Short sketches of the lives of the principal participants, 
with attention given to their characters and convictions, fill the
3pages of the second chapter* Included.are personalities in the 
government, in the opposition, in the War Office and with the army 
in Ireland.
Chapter III covers, in detail, the Curxayh Incident itself; 
the chronology, the movements and the popular and political reactions. 
Reasoned conjecture fills the gaps in the documented information. 
Tenative identifications appear of stalwarts, fumblers and black­
guards .
The very intense political crisis generated by the incident 
becomes the chief theme of Chapter IV. Other ramifications also 
merit discussion: the deleterious effect of the incident on army
morale, the transformation of Ulster into an armed camp and the 
conclusions of international observers.
The last chapter contains some speculation on the liklihood, 
widely accepted at the time, of a plot on the part of the government 
to provoke and coerce Ulster. Some observations on military officers 
who engage in political maneuver and intrigue are put forward. A 
conclusion is presented on the danger of parliamentary majorities 
attempting to impose legislative solutions to volatile political 
problems without gaining acquiescence of affected minorities.
CHAPTER I
THE ISSUES 
Home Rule For Ireland
William E. Gladstone, the Grand Old Man of the Liberal Party 
during the final years of the nineteenth century, introduced the 
first Home Rule for Ireland Bill in the House of Commons in 1886. 
Under the bill, Ireland was to be given its own parliament which 
would have authority over strictly local affairs. Control of fore­
ign, military and naval affairs would be retained by the British 
Parliament and the Crown would continue to exercise constitutional 
sovereignty over both England and Ireland. Eighty-six Irish Members 
of Parliament, led by Charles S. Parnell, supported the government’s 
Home Rule Bill, but a large number of Gladstone’s Liberal colleagues, 
calling themselves the Liberal Unionists, joined with the Tories and 
seventeen members from Ulster to defeat the bill.1 The Ulster members 
vehemently opposed submitting the administration of the Protestant-
dominated counties in the northeast province of Ulster to a par-
2
liament in Dublin certain to be controlled by Catholics. A majority 
of the English Members of Parliament, for varying reasons, sided with 
the Ulsterities. Not the least of those in opposition was Lord
^Dorothy Macardle, The Irish Republic (4th ed.; New York: 
Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1965), 56. Hereafter cited as Macardle, 
Republic.
2Ibid., 77.
4
5Randolph Churchill who, in a letter to another Liberal Unionist on 
May 7, 1886, gave Ulster a rallying cry that still remained in use 
in 1914:
If political pailies and political leaders, not only 
parliamentary but local should be so utterly lost to every 
feeling and dictate of honour and courage as to hand over 
coldly, and for the sake of purchasing a short and illusory 
Parliamentary Tranquillity, the lives and liberties of the 
loyalists of Ireland to their hereditary and most bitter 
foes, make no doubt on this point— Ulster will not be a con­
senting party; Ulster at the proper moment will resort to 
the supreme arbitrament of force; Ulster will fight; Ulster 
will be right.^
Lord Randolph, somewhat cynically, referred to this championing of 
Protestant Ulster over the Catholics of the South of Ireland as 
playing the "Orange card;" he hoped it would turn out to be the
4 •
ace of trumps. lyj
Defeat on the Home Rule Bill brought about the fall of the 
Gladstone government. When his party returned to power in 1893, 
Gladstone proposed another Home Rule measure which, though it passed 
through the House of Commons, met defeat in the House.of Lords. The 
political power of Parnell and his Irish Nationalists subsided sharply 
after 1890 when Parnell, a Protestant involved in a divorce action, 
lost the support of the Irish Catholics. The bishops and priests 
would not have their people led by a Protestant adulterer, whatever
^The Earl of Oxford and Asquith, Fifty Years of British 
Parliament (2 vols.; Boston: Little Brown, and Company, 1926),
II, 274-275. Hereafter cited as Asquith, Fifty Years.
^'Randolph S. Churchill, Winston S. Churchill, Volume I I ; 
1901-1914: Young Statesman (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company,
1967), 425. Hereafter cited as Churchill, Churchill .
65his political prowess. Home Rule for Ireland did not become a 
viable issue again until 1912, when a series of fortuitous political 
events joined to insure the reading of the third Home Rule Bill and 
to virtually assure its passage.
The Liberal Party returned to power in 1905. The Liberal 
government programs, down to the beginning of 1912, emphasized 
social welfare legislation and budgetary reform rather than home 
rule for Ireland. These programs, too, met defeat in the House of 
Lords. When the Lords rejected the government budget in 1909, the 
Liberals resolved to break the power of the hereditary house. It 
soon developed that they needed the support of the Irish Nationalists 
to accomplish this end. A general election in January, 1910 returned 
275 Liberals and 273 Unionists, giving the balance of power to eighty- 
two Irish Nationalist and forty Labour members. The Lords now ac­
cepted the budget but the Liberal government was determined to break 
the Lords1 veto power. The government introduced a Parliament Bill 
which provided that a bill passed in Commons three times in two years 
-would become law without the assent of the Lords. Before the Parli­
ament Bill could become an act, however, the Lords had to consent to 
-giving up their political power. This they refused to do and, as
^Constantine Fitzgibbon, Out of the Lionrs Paw; Ireland Wins 
Her Freedom (New York: American Heritage Press, 1969), 9. Here­
after cited as Fitzgibbon, L i o n ^  P a w .
R. K. Webb, Modern England; From the Eighteenth Century to 
the Present (New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1971), 459. Here­
after cited as Webb, Modern England.
77
Professor R. K. Webb remarks, "There was no Wellington in sight."
The Liberal Prime Minister, Herbert H. Asquith, asked King George V 
to prepare to create several hundred new (Liberal) peers to break 
the power of the conservative Lords. The king agreed if another 
general election confirmed that this was indeed the will of the 
electorate. Realizing they needed Irish Nationalist support for 
their continuance in power, the Liberal Party made the Lords’ veto 
and Home Rule for Ireland the outstanding issues in the second
O
general election in 1910. The Irish Nationalists supported the
Parliament Bill, knowing Home Rule was impossible unless the Lords’
veto was removed. The election in December, 1910, produced almost
the same results as the January election: 272 Liberals, 272 Union-
9ists, 84 Irish Nationalists and 42 Labourites. The Lords gave m  
and the Parliament Bill became the Parliament Act of 1911. John 
Redmond and his Irish Nationalists were now ready for Asquith and 
his Liberals to make good on the election campaign promise regarding 
Home Rule for Ireland.
The Third Home Rule Bill offered Ireland little more politi­
cal autonomy than the rejected bills of the late nineteenth century. 
Roy Jenkins, a biographer of Prime Minister Asquith, writes that "the 
Dublin Parliament was to be so circumscribed in its powers as to be
^Wsbb, Modern England, 460.
8Macardle, Irish Republic, 70.
^Webb, Modern England, 460.
8closer to a ’glorified county council’ than to a soverign assembly.M 
The provisions of the bill stipulated the Imperial Parliament would 
continue to control foreign relations, military affairs and taxation 
and that it retained the power to allow or repeal any act of the 
Irish Parliament. Forty-six members would still represent Ireland 
in the House of Commons at Westminster. The Irish Parliament would 
not be allowed to enact legislation that affected any church. These 
arrangements, very similar to those that prevail in the six counties 
of Northern Ireland today, were not satisfactory to the Ulster Union­
ists/^'*' The bill dealt with the whole of Ireland and Ulster was not 
prepared to accept rule from Dublin--which many Ulsterites felt would 
be ’’Rome” rule. Sir Edward Carson, the leader of the Ulster Union­
ists, echoed Lord Randolph Churchill of twenty-five years before when, 
in September, 1911, he addressed a large gathering at Craigavon, near 
Belfast. Carson said, "We must be prepared . . . the morning Home
Rule is passed, ourselves to become responsible for the government
12of the Protestant Province of Ulster."
Conservative Opposition 
The Conservative politicians, with the notable exception 
of their leader, Andrew Bonar Law, were not particularly interested
■*-°Roy Jenkins, Asquith; Portrait of a Man and an Era (New 
York: Chilmark Press, 1964), 274. Hereafter cited as Jenkins, Asquith.
1 1
A. P. Ryan, Mutiny at the Curragh (London: Macmxllan,
1956, 44. Hereafter cited as Ryan, Mutiny.
1 9 .
Quoted in Jenkins, Asquith, 274.
9in the fortunes of Northern Ireland but they quickly recognized 
the political potential in the problem of Ulster. Once again, the 
’’Orange card” was the one to play. The Tories had been out of power 
since 1905 and were getting very office-hungry. Asquith quietly 
pointed out that there were already over twenty self-governing legis- 
latures under the allegiance to the Crown, but the Conservatives 
derided the Home Rule Bill as an attempt to restore the Heptarchy-- 
the division of England into little kingdoms m  Saxon times. A l ­
though diverted by the investigation of the sinking of the Titanic, 
sharp debate on Ireland continued in the House of Commons through 
the spring of 1912. There was much high-blown eloquence; one 
Unionist claimed the transfer of Ulster was as horrible as the 
transfer of Poland to Russia. Nevertheless, the bill passed easily 
on the second reading, 372-271.^  Throughout the effort, the bill 
was never challenged by parliamentary numbers. The Prime Minister 
points this out: ’’The average majority in almost countless divisions
was well over one hundred, and, if the Irish vote on both sides was 
subtracted, it had, throughout, the support of a substantial majority 
of the representatives of Great Britain.”^  The Unionists recognized 
this and moved their cause outside the House of Commons.
^3Pall Mall Gazette (London), September 14, 1912, 2.
^ G r e a t  Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary Debates (House of 
Commons), 5th ser., Vol. 38 (6 May-22 May, 1912), 708. Hereafter 
cited as Parliamentary Debates with series, volume and inclusive dates.
■^Asquith, Fifty Years, 148.
10
At a huge demonstration held at Balmoral (Ireland) on Easter 
Tuesday of 1912, Sir Edward Carson led the crowd in a pledge that 
"never under any circumstances will we submit to Home Rule.""^
Bonar Law, seconding Carson, speculated that the Scottish people 
would face a second Bannockburn or Flodden rather than submit to the 
fate that confronted Ulster. The Times, reporting on the demon­
stration, summed up the Ulster position:
Ulstermen . . . do not admit the right of Parliament--and
still less of Parliament as the Liberals have maimed it--to 
deprive them of their fundamental rights as British citizens. 
They agree with Mr. Bonar Law that, in all history, no prece­
dent exists for such a step. They would not have one created 
at their expense. . . . It would take them from under the pro­
tection of the British government and of the British Parlia­
ment and place them under the rule of men whose ways are not 
their ways and whose standards are not their standards--under 
the men who control the United Irish League and the Ancient 
Order of Hibernians. To them that rule means ruin. They will 
not submit to it, unless it be forced upon them by arms, and 
they cannot bring themselves to believe that their fellow 
British subjects will consent to force it upon them."*-8
19
Asquith regarded all this as the "complete Grammar of Anarchy."
Bonar Law had just begun. At a large Unionist gathering at 
Blenheim in July, 1912, he leveled this blast at the government;
. . . if an attempt were made without the clearly expressed
will of the people of this country, and as part of a corrupt 
parliamentary bargain, to deprive these men of their birthright, 
they would be justified by resisting by all means in their 
power, including force. .
1 The Times (London), April 10, 1912, 8.
17Ibid. 18Ibid.
•^Asquith, Fifty Years, 152.
^°The Times (London), July 29, 1912, 8.
11
As if that was not enough, he continued:
I can imagine no length of resistance to which Ulster 
can go in which I should not be prepared to support them, and 
in which, in my belief, they would not be supported by the 
overwhelming majority of the British people.
Asquith, not unreasonably, called this a ’’declaration of war against
22Constitutional Government.”
A rising young minister in the Liberal Government, Lord 
Randolph Churchill’s son Winston, took sharp exception to his an­
cestral home being used by Bonar Law to incite Orangemen to make 
civil war on their fellow countrymen and on British soldiers. 
Churchill was a renegade Unionist and privately favored the exclu­
sion of Ulster from the Home Rule Bill* He was, however, against 
anarchy. In a letter to Sir George Richie on September 8, 1912, 
Churchill wrote that Bonar L a w ’s action was fatal to constitutional 
evolution. Concerned about the stirring up of the poor, he com­
pared Bonar L a w ’s pronouncements at Blenheim with Ben Tillet’s on 
Tower Hill during the dock strike in 1889. Churchill wrote that the 
Conservative leader was committing his party to excess and to acts 
which were cruel, wicked and contrary to law. Bonar Law was pan­
dering to an hysterical spirit of violence. Churchill hoped the
Blenheim statement would cause the more reasonable Conservatives
21to act with more restraint.
21
The Times (London), July 29, 1912, 8.
22Asquith, Fifty Years, 154.
^ Pall Mall Gazette (London), August 12, 1912, 3.
12
Asquith tested the wind in 1912 by making a trip to Dublin 
for a meeting with John Redmond; the first Prime Minister in his­
tory, he proudly notes in his memoirs, to visit Ireland.24 The 
Irish were friendly but the suffragettes were not. One threw a
p  c
hatchet that missed Asquith but gave Redmond a superficial wound. 
Another set fire to Dublin’s Theatre Royal during an Asquith ad­
dress. Before the smoke drove him from the stage, the Prime Min­
ister denounced the Ulster attitude as unreasonable but he would 
not commit himself on the use of the British army or the possibility 
of civil war.
Ulster
As A. J. Ryan remarks in his book, Mutiny at the Curragh,
"Constitutional processes only work if all parties affected by them,
including minority parties, arc prepared to play by the rules.
Carson cared for the result, being sincerely convinced that Justice
was on his side, and did not give a fig for the rules. Herein his
approach was the opposite to that of Asquith and completely accept-
27able to Ulster." Ulsterites considered themselves an alien min­
ority in Ireland. They felt their very survival depended on their
Asquith, Fifty Years, 158.
25The Times (London), April 20, 1912, 9.
26Ibid., 10.'
^^Ryan, Mutiny, 23.
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vigilance and solidarity. They asserted they would not peacefully
submit the administration of their enclave to papist majorities
/
from the provinces of Lenister, Munster and Connaught.
Political and religious delinations were not so geograph­
ically sharp as might be supposed. All Ulster was not against Home 
Rule. John Redmond explained this in Reynold's Magazine on January 8, 
1911. There was really "no Ulster question.” There were nine 
counties in Ulster and in five of them (Carvon, Donegal, Fermanagh,
O  O
Monaghan and Tyrone) the Catholic Nationalists were in the majority. 
Even Antrim, Armagh, Down and Londonderry had significant Nation-
PQ
alist minorities. ^ The Nationalists were not politically active 
in Ulster, however, and the dominant Unionists solidly supported the 
Empire and Protestantism. The Unionists declared, if they could 
not save Ulster for the Empire by political action, they meant to 
do it with guns.
On January 5, 1912, a Colonel Wallace, fronting for Carson 
and Sir James Craig, the acknowledged Ulster Unionist leaders, secured 
permission from a Belfast Justice of the Peace for the Orange fraternal 
lodges to practice military drill. The lodges, Wallace maintained, 
"desire this authority as faithful subjects of His Majesty the King 
only to make them more efficient citizens for the purpose of main­
taining the constitution of the United Kingdom as now established 
and protecting their rights and liberties thereunder.”^  The Liberal
28
Cited in Asquith, Fifty Years, 151. 
^Ryan, Mutiny, 29. ^ Ibid. , 30-31.
14
government had recently abolished the long-standing prohibition a-
gainst importing guns into Ireland, but it was necessary, at first,
for the lodges to train with dummy rifles. Some Liberals jeered at
31men playing with wooden toys. Lord Roberts, the hero of South 
Africa, helped recruit retired British officers to train the Ulster 
volunteers. Lord Milner, leader of an English movement for the sup­
port of Ulster, also helped convince half-pay and reserve officers 
of the British army to command regiments in the Ulster Volunteer 
Force.32
Sir James Craig, with the help of Protestant church leaders, 
developed the "Solemn League and Covenant." The Covenant was based 
on an old Scottish pledge from the seventeenth century. On "Ulster 
Day," September 28, 1912, eighty thousand Ulsterites gathered at 
specially-arranged religious services to sign the Covenant. By 
1914, the various Covenant documents had one-half million signa­
tures.3^ The Covenanteers swore to support the king--while defy­
ing the law:
Being convinced in our consciences that Home Rule would 
be disasterous for the material well-being of Ulster as well as 
the whole of Ireland, subversive to our civil and religious 
freedom, destructive to our citizenship and perilous to the 
unity of the Empire, we, whose names are underwritten, men of
3-^Churchill, Churchill, 457.
•^Robert Kee, The Green Flag; The Turbulent History of the 
Irish Nationalist Movement (New York: Delacorte Press, 1972),
478, 485. Hereafter cited as Kee, Green Flag.
33The Times (London), September 30, 1912, 10.
^^Ryan, Mutiny, 57-60.
15
Ulster, loyal subjects of his gracious majesty, King George V, 
humbly relying on the God whom our fathers in days of stress 
and trial confidently trusted, do hereby pledge ourselves in 
solemn Covenant throughout this our time of threatened calam­
ity to stand by one another in defending for ourselves and our 
children our cherished possession of equal citizenship in the 
United Kingdom, and in using all means which may be found nec­
essary to defeat the present conspiracy to set a Home Rule 
Parliament in Ireland. And in the event of such a parliament 
being forced upon us, we further solemnly and mutually pledge 
ourselves to refuse to recognize its authority. In sure con­
fidence that God will defend the right we hereto subscribe our 
names. And further, we individually declare that we have not 
already signed this Covenant. God save the King.^5
Conservatism of the British Army 
As the threat of insurrection and civil war in Ireland be­
came more real, the newspapers and public speakers began to speculate 
on the attitude of the officer corps of the British army regarding 
the future of Ulster. Military men had opinions and prejudices on 
political and religious subjects as intense as those of their civilian 
counterparts. A large group of officers were particularly concerned 
about the issue of Home Rule. The nineteenth century Land Acts 
brought about a decline in the fortunes of many Anglo-Irish families 
and large numbers of the younger sons of these families turned to
the army for a career. So Ulstermen were particularly numerous
36among the army officers. An uncertainty now arose about what the 
army's reaction would be to orders to march into Ulster and subdue 
the Unionists. In the past, the army's troubles in Ireland had been
^ Pall Mall Gazette (London), September 20, 1912, 1.
^ R o b e r t  Blake, The Unknown Prime Minister; the Life and 
Times of Andrew Bonar Law, 1858-1923 (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode,
1955), 177. Hereafter cited as Blake, Bonar Law.
16
with extremist Irish nationalists. Would there be defections and 
resignations in the army if it was ordered to put down the Ulster 
Volunteers? Many thought so. The question was not a new one. Dur­
ing an earlier Home Rule debate in 1886, a Tory politician had con­
fidently stated the army would not obey orders to shoot down Ulster . 
37Unionists. As the Ulster Volunteer Force expanded, a gnawing
O o
uneasiness grew about the army attitude.
British army officers, like most European army officers,
while not specific about party affiliation, were conservative in
their political thinking. Regular officers in standing armies have
traditionally been associated with reactionary politics and the estab- 
39lished church. The peacetime adversary of the standing army is 
generally the Liberal politician. The Liberal politician, in turn, 
views the army as a hostile institution. A natural tendency of 
armies is to attempt to extend their power outside their assigned 
spheres, hence any army interest in volitale political situations 
is viewed with a l a r m . T h e  army must react immediately, without 
political polemics, to the orders of the government. If such re­
action is uncertain, or if the response to orders becomes selective, 
the army is no longer a bulwark of the government--it becomes a
^ K e e ,  Green Flag, 486.
5o
Pall Mall Gazette (London), March 3, 1914, 2.
39Alfred Vagts, A History of Militarism; Romance and Real­
ities of a Profession (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc.,
1937), 340.
40Ibid., 320, 339.
17
threat to the political stability of the state. The professional 
officers of the British army, well aware that dependibility is the 
most essential of all military attributes, prided themselves on 
their reputation for doing their duty and serving with honor. 
Discipline, self-denial and unquestioning devotion to duty were 
among their most ancient traditions. Still, the politicians worried
that ordejs to enforce the Home Rule Bill in Ulster might trigger
41wholesale resignations m  the officer corps.
The army provided a lifetime career for almost all the regu- 
officers up to 1914. Brigadier-Generals and Colonels were in their 
fifties; Lieutenant-Generals in their sixties. All felt particu­
larly bound to the King. The Monarch had personally signed the com­
missions of all but the youngest group of officers. Many had family 
traditions of military service extending back several generations.
Yet, regardless of their oaths and traditions, many of them grew
42highly emotional over the problem of Ulster. Were not Ulstermen,
who only wanted to remain under the Union Jack, also the K i n g ’s men?
Why, they asked, should the army have to support the hated Hibernians
43by fighting against the K i n g ’s loyal subjects? George V himself 
asked the Prime Minister in September, 1913, if the discipline and
^ Parliamentary Debates, 5th ser., Vol. 53 (27 May-13 June, 
1913), 1370.
^2Pall Mall Gazette (London), December 1, 1913.
^ S i r  James Fergusson, The Curragh Incident (London: Faber
and Faber, Limited, 1964), 28. Hereafter cited as Fergusson, Cur­
ragh Incident.
18
loyalty of the troops should be put to such strains. Asquith could
only reply that discipline and loyalty demand submission to all such
44strains within the law.
Threat of Civil War
In January, 1913, a group of prominent Ulster Unionists drafted
a scheme for a provisional government. The draft provided for a
Central Authority to carry on the business of government when and
45if the Home Rule Bill became law. Eminent politicians, churchmen 
and military men expressed themselves willing to serve on the Central 
Authority. Skeptics noted the absence of working men among the 
volunteer administrators. The draft began: "The Central Authority
in the name of the K i n g ’s Most Excellent Majesty . . ." An in­
demnity fund of one million pounds, for the provisional government’s
4 .7
operating expenses, was oversubscribed. Carson was now being
called "King Carson." By the fall of 1913, the Ulster provisional
government was formed and ready in Belfast and elements of the 60,000-
man Ulster Volunteer Force, commanded by a retired Indian officer,
Lieutenant-General Sir George Richardson, marched in review before 
48Carson. In his speech on that day, Carson said he had pledges and
4^Pall Mall Gazette (London), September 18, 1913, 3.
4^Ryan, Mutiny, 69.
^ Pall Mall Gazette (London), September 26, 1913, 1.
A R
The Times (London), September 29, 1913, 7.
19
promises from some of the greatest generals in the army to come over
49and help the provisional forces if it became necessary. All this 
was patently against the law, but observers speculated that the govern­
ment did not prosecute because they did not want King Carson to b e ­
come Saint C a r s o n . ^
This was true. In his memoirs, Prime Minister Asquith gives
his reasons for not arresting Carson. It was true, he concedes,
that Carson, Bonar Law and others had spoken out in strong terms
about the necessity of flouting Parliament and resorting to direct
action. But he says such political ’’vapouring" is best ignored and
its perpetrators left alone. Charges of treason or'insurrection need
to be based on something more solid than bombast. There was no question
that Carson’s activities in Ulster were beyond the law but, if he
were arrested, it would be necessary to try him in Ulster and, "it
was' as certain as any of the sequences of nature that no Irish jury
would convict." And finally Asquith says that it was imperative
that the transfer of authority to the new parliament be made in an
aura of peace and that this could not be accomplished by j'ailing
opposition leaders. The Prime Minister was looking for some plan
which would meet the special case of Ulster "without denying or de-
51laying the claim of the maj'ority."
Meanwhile the Home Rule Bill (officially the Government of 
Ireland Bill) progressed steadily through committee and was passed
50
Pall Mall Gazette (London), August 7, 1913, 9. 
“^ Asquith, Fifty Years, 155-159.
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on the second reading for the second time in the House of Commons.
In an attempt to allay the fears of Ulster, the supremacy of the
Imperial Parliament over future Irish affairs was strengthened and
emphasized. Carson, seconded by Bonar Law, saw there was not enough
support to put the motion to a vote. Bonar Law said Ulster would
prefer foreign to Nationalist rule. Winston Churchill expressed
mock horror at the latest Tory threat--that Ulster would secede to
Germany. Arthur Balfour asked the government if, in the cause of
53
the bill, they meant to shoot down Ulstermen. The House of Lords, 
as expected, rejected the bill for the second time. Once more
54
through Commons in 1914 and the Home Rule Bill would become law.
In the latter part of 1913, individuals on both sides be­
gan to search for a compromise. Even some of the more militant 
Tories began to have misgivings. There were indications--rough
houses, stone and bottle throwing, a fractured skull--that the
55
Ulster Volunteers were getting out of hand. A newspaper article 
outlined the problems that might arise between the Covenanteers and 
the army:
The Ulster Covenant was signed by soldiers as it was 
signed by most distingushed judges and they entertain the
52Parliamentary Debates, 5th ser., Vol. 53 (27 May-13 June, 
1913), 1584.
53Ibid., 1306.
3^Ryan, Mut iny, 72.
^ Pall Mall Gazette (London), August 15, 1913, 1-2.
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reasonable fear that even even before the Home Rule Bill 
can pass into law, the government may be compelled to bring 
troops into collision with the forces of the Unionists in 
Ireland. Should the bill be passed next May, the army 
will then be confronted by a situation more serious still; 
and it is nortorious that some officers have already begun 
to speak of sending in their papers.56
Lord Loreburn, the former Liberal Lord Chancellor, stated in The Times
that bloodshed was certain unless the party leaders would meet and
57agree on a compromise. '
The King was deeply concerned and searching for a solution. 
Bonar Law and Lord Landsdowne suggested the King withhold assent to 
the Home Rule Bill, force dissolution of the government and call for 
a general election. When the King proposed this to Lord Ester, the 
Liberal peer advised strongly against it. Ester said the issue in 
such an election would not be home rule but, "Is the country govern­
ed by the King or the people?" Asquith warned the King that withhold- 
royal assent was no longer viable. The last time assent had been 
withheld was in the reign of Queen Anne. A general election would 
make nonsense of the Parliament Act. If the King forced a general 
election, Asquith said every government minister, beginning with 
himself, would attack the King from public platforms. George V 
decided to reject the Tory suggestion but he pleaded with Asquith to
tro
meet with the opposition leaders and search for a compromise.
5 6Quoted in Ryan, Mutiny, 74-75.
57The Times (London), September 12, 1913, 7-8.
58Harold Nicholson, King George the Fifth (Garden City, NY: 
Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1953), 224-229. Hereafter cited as Nichol- 
son’ George V . Jenkins, Asqui th, 283. Ryan, Mutiny, 77.
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In late 1913, a series of meetings was held between the 
leaders of the various parties, but no progress was made toward 
finding a compromise. Bonar Law and Carson said they would accept 
only the complete exclusion of Ulster from the Home Rule Bill (the 
boundaries of the area to be excluded were not d e f i n e d ) . Asquith, 
in a letter to Lord Loreburn, wrote that he was willing to compromise 
on everything except that the Irish Parliament must represent the 
entire island. The Prime Minister stated this plan was favored by 
four-fifths of Ireland and a substantial majority of the present and
z: /"*
late House of Commons. Redmond, having increasing difficulty hold­
ing his own party together in the face of the wavering attitude of 
his Liberal allies, told Asquith the Nationalists’ final position 
was "autonomy for Ulster under the final supremacy of a Dublin Par- 
liament." At the beginning of 1914, all efforts at compromise on 
the Government of Ireland Bill had failed.
59The Times (London), September 15, 1913, 7.
^°Ryan, Mutiny, 85.
^Churchill, Churchill, 468.
CHAPTER II
THE PARTICIPANTS
In the Government 
Herbert Henry Asquith, Liberal Prime Minister after 1908, 
the Member for East Fife since 1886, was sixty-two years old in 
1914. His interest in the Irish question dated from 1888 when he 
served as a junior counsel before the Parnell Commission. Asquith 
was Home Secretary from 1892 to 1895. After a rather long period 
during which his party was out of office, he became Chancellor of 
the Exchequer in the new Liberal government of 1905. When illness 
forced Henry Campbell-Bannerman to resign in 1908, Asquith became 
Prime Minister. As he searched for a way to overcome the obstruc­
tionism of the House of Lords, that house provided an issue by re­
jecting the government budget in 1909. An appeal to the electorate
secured the passage of the budget, but the Liberal Party was no
longer willing, even in non-financial matters, to accept the Lords * 
power of veto. Asquith reached a tacit agreement with King George V 
regarding the creation of sufficient new peers to break the power 
of the Lords, if such was demonstrated to be the will of the people 
in another general election. The election returns were favorable
but the new peers were not necessary. The Lords, albeit with ill
23
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grace, accepted the Parliament Act of 1911.
In 1912, The Liberal Party had been committed to Home Rule 
for Ireland for more than a quarter of a century and Asquith's 
government introduced a new Home Rule Bill in the House of Commons.
Of at least equal significance to the home rule tradition was the 
fact that the Asquith government needed Irish Nationalist voting 
support to continue in power. When Sir Edward Carson and the Unionist 
leaders of Protestant Ulster, asserting that armed resistance was 
their only remaining alternative since the limitation of the veto 
power of the House of Lords, formed military units to resist Home 
Rule, Asquith was confounded. He had not expected an unparliamen­
tary challenge to a parliamentary issue. In the past, compromise 
had saved England from revolution. Wellington convinced the Tories 
not to oppose the Reform Act of 1832; Peel led his colleagues in 
accepting the repeal of the Corn Laws. Asquith could not believe 
a political party would ever defy a majority decision of the House 
of Commons. The House of Lords would delay it as long as they
2
could but the Home Rule Bill would be law before 1914 was over.
Asquith was highly educated. He had no deep-seated religious 
convictions but he was a trustworthy man. People in the opposition
J . A. Spender, "Herbert Henry Asquith" in the Dictionary of 
National Biography, (1922-1930), ed. by J. R. H. Weaver (London:
Oxford University Press, 1937), 29-34.
o
George Dangerfield, The Strange Death of Liberal England 
(New York: Capricorn Books, 1961), 99-i.01.
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and in the army may not have agreed with him but they did trust
him. He was an impressive lawyer and parliamentarian; full of
3
common sense. His solidity made him strong and respected.
John Edward Redmond, the Irish Nationalist leader, a native 
of the Wexford coast, was educated at Trinity College, Dublin. A 
clerk in the House of Commons even before he became the Member for 
New Ross in 1881, he had been an active supporter of Parnell. Red­
m o n d ’s nationalism, unlike Parnell ’ s, was not based on hostility 
toward the British Empire. A man of intense loyalties, Redmond 
supported Parnell throughout the latter’s personal and political
crises in 1890 and 1891 and refused to assume the active leadership
4
of the Irish Nationalists until after Parnell’s death.
Redmond, a skilled debater in Parliament, never indulged in 
personal or partisan vilification. He had continual difficulty 
keeping his party united. There were many sub-surface factional 
movements both in Ireland and in the House of Commons (’’There are 
two United Irish parties in this House;” Mr. Timothy Healy once re­
marked to the House of Commons, ”1 am one of them.’’).5 From 1906 
to 1909, Redmond championed Home Rule in Parliament and tried to
•v
o
George Dangerfield, The Strange Death of Liberal England,
17-18.
^'Stephen Gwynn, ’’John Edward Redmond” in the Dictionary of 
National Biography (1912-1921), ed. by H. W. C. Davis and J. R. H. 
Weaver (London: Oxford University Press, 1927), 447-452. Hereafter
cited as Gwynn, ’’Redmond.”
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hold his volatile factions together at home. By 1912, the Irish 
Nationalist support of the Liberals in the elections brought on by 
the debates over the Parliament Act had done a great deal to dilute 
English animosity toward the Irish. The Nationalist cause was no 
longer as unpopular as earlier in the century.
Redmond did not really understand Ulster. He tended to 
view the military preparations being made there as a bluff. In the 
beginning of 1914, Redmond, fifty-eight years old, still believing 
in Liberal promises and parliamentary procedures, refused to sanc­
tion the formation in the South of the Irish Volunteers as a counter­
weight to the Ulster Volunteer Force.^ By this time, however,
enthusiasm for Redmond as leader had begun to decline. A group of
7
more rampant nationalists, the Sinn Fein, was rising in Ireland.
There would be occasion, some fifty years after the events
of 1914, to eulogize Winston Spencer Churchill as the savior of his 
, 8
country. In 1914, he was, at forty years of age, First Lord of 
the Admiralty and engrossed with improving the British navy. In 
the beginning he tried to dilute the Home Rule' controversy as much 
as possible. Had he not been in the government, Churchill would 
probably have sided with his close friend, F. E. Smith, against 
Home Rule. Even years later, Churchill’s imperial sentiments were
^Gwynn, ’’Redmond,” 450-451.
7
Ryan, Mutiny, 17.
8A. J. P. Taylor, English History, 1914-1945 (Oxford: The
Clarendon Press, 1965), 4n.
27
hard to put down. Churchill supported his party’s committment to
give Ireland a parliament but he went further. He said the claims
of Ulster for special treatment could not be ignored and he implied
that changes to the bill would be welcomed by the Liberals, if
9such changes were agreed to by a parliamentary majority.
Changes to proposed legislation were acceptable but threats 
of insurrection were something else again. Churchill’s position 
noticeably hardened after the Unionist demonstrations at Balmoral 
and Blenheim. He said Carson was engaged in "a treasonable con­
spiracy" and he derided the Unionist attitude with telling sarcasm: 
" . . .  coercion for four-fifths of Ireland is a healthful, exhil­
arating and salutary exercise— but lay a finger on the Tory one- 
fifth- -sacrilege , tyranny, murder I " ^  To Churchill, the constitu­
tional issue was much more important than the Home Rule issue. In 
The World Crisis, he states: "I would never coerce Ulster to make
her come under a Dublin Parliament but I would do all that was 
necessary to prevent her stopping the rest of Ireland having the 
Parliament they desired. . . . In support of it I was certainly
prepared to maintain the authority of Crown and Parliament under 
the constitution by whatever means were necessary." This, as 
became evident, was not political vapouring.
^Churchill, Churchill, 427, 462.
•^Quoted in Churchill, Churchill, 471-472.
■^Winston S. Churchill, The World Crisis (New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1931), 94. Hereafter cited as Churchill, Crisis.
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John E. B. Seely was Secretary of State for War in 1914,
having succeeded the great Lord Haldane in 1912. Seely had a
Liberal background; both his grandfathers had been members of the
Anti-Corn Law League. As a child he had sat on John Bright’s knee,
and had once taken tea with Gladstone. A Yeomanry Colonel in the
Boer War, he had a flair for gallant, if sometimes ill-advised,
action. Despite his Liberal exposure, Seely began his political
career as a Conservative Member of Parliament and then, like Churchill,
12crossed the aisle.
Seely has been described as brave, ambitious, arrogant and 
13 . .stubborn but, significantly, no one ever called him brilliant.
Arthur Balfour, learning that an accident in Switzerland had im­
mobilized Seely for many months with a brain concussion, said, "My
14
dear Jack, that explains it all!" Seely once jumped off a pier 
to save what he thought was a drowning man only to find it was a 
champion swimmer giving a life-saving demonstration. According to 
A. P. Ryan, Seely "took war-like decisions with equal gusto and lack 
of wisdom."-1'^
Elevation to the cabinet turned his head. As an ex-Colonel 
of the Yeomanry, Seely relished giving orders to Field-Marshalls and
12 13Ryan, Mutiny, 95-96. Fergusson, Curragh Incident, 30.
^'%4aJor-General the Rt. Hon. J. E. B. Seely, Adventure (New
York: Frederick A. Stokes Company, 1930), 12-13. Hereafter cited
as Seely, Adventure.
l5Ryan, Mutiny, 96-97.
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Generals. He could never gain the respect and confidence of the
military leaders. One officer said, "If he [Seely] had just a
little more brains, h e fd be h a l f - w i t t e d . H e  was the opposite
of Haldane; the soldiers found they had exchanged a Schopenhauer
for a Cyrano de Bergerac. Forty-six years old in 1914, Seely did
not have any strong views on Home Rule and Ulster.
Three other government ministers were involved, to lesser
degrees, in the Curragh Incident. Augustine Birrell, Chief Secretary
for Ireland, never really understood the political undercurrents in
that island but may have intensified the crisis when he ridiculed
18Carson as "an elderly barrister." John.Morley, a Home Ruler from
another era, was Lord President of the Council. Viscount Haldane,
Lord Chancellor in 1914, was still respected by the generals. Had
he still been Secretary for War, Haldane might have prevented the
19Curragh Incident. But only Asquith, Redmond, Churchill and Seely 
were on the main stage.
In the Opposition
v
Andrew Bonar Law was born in 1858 in New Brunswick, the son 
of a Presbyterian minister from Ulster; his mother the daughter of 
a Glascow iron merchant. He was educated in Scotland and became a 
staunch conservative in his political thinking. Made independently
■j /  y
Fergusson, Curragh Incident, 30. Ryan, Mutiny, 97.
18Ian Covin, The Life of Lord Carson (3 Vols.; London:
Victor Gollancz, Ltd., 1934-1936), II, 305. Hereafter cited as 
Covin, Carson.
•^Ryan, Mutiny, 17.
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wealthy by inheritance, Bonar Law became active in politics and was
20returned to Parliament for a section of Glascow m  1900.  ^ A sup­
porter of Joseph Chamberlain’s imperial preference scheme, Bonar 
Law was more comprehensible, and certainly more energetic, than 
Arthur Balfour, the Conservative Party leader. In 1909, Bonar Law 
denounced the government budget as socialistic; he also fought 
against plans for health and unemployment insurance. A compromise 
choice between Walter Long and Austen Chamberlain, Bonar Law became
leader of the Conservatives and Unionists in the House of Commons
21 . in 1911. He fought, unsuccessfully, against the Parliament Act
of 1911. , j
Bonar Law may have been unable to stopj the passage of the
Parliament Act but he had no intention of deserting his cousins in
!
Ulster simply because his party did not have a 'parliamentary majority
j
The Conservative leader’s threats of organized disorder over the 
Ulster question were inexcusable; completely contrary to parlia­
mentary processes. Although he was probably sincere in his concern 
for Ulster, undoubtably a strong subordinate consideration was the 
political advantage that would accrue to the Conservatives if the 
Liberals were discredited over the Home Rule issue. But for an
opposition leader to announce, M . . . there are stronger things
22than parliamentary majorities,” flirts with anarchy. Churchill
20Thomas Jones, ”Andrew Bonar Law” in the Dictionary of 
National Biography (1922-1930), ed. by J. R. H. Weaver (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1937), 483-485.
^Blake, Bonar L a w , 56, 86.
^Churchill, Churchill, 453.
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• - 23accused Bonar Law of "almost treasonable activity."
Sir Edward Carson was born in Dublin in 1854 of Scottish 
and Irish antecedents. After studying law at Trinity College, he 
became a respected and important barrister. Appointed Solicitor- 
General of Ireland in 1893, he was returned to Parliament for Dublin 
University in that same year. He joined the Middle Temple in 1893. 
Carson became famous as an advocate when he supported the Marquis 
of Queensberry against Oscar Wilde in 1895. In January, 1910,
Carson was chosen leader of the Irish Unionists in the House of 
Commons. He once stated, "Devotion to the Union has been the guiding
' I
star of my political life."24
ft 3
V- ’I
CarsonTs feeling for the union appears to have been genuine
and, perhaps because he had a better grasp of Jlrish realities than
.«'■ J
•' 1Redmond, he believed that Ulster could not be iseperated from the
' f
Empire without a fight. He was politically ambitious. He was also
• i
vain and basked in the adulation given him by ;the Ulsterites.2^
i
! . *
His legal experience had convinced him that it was the verdict, not
b .a
the means, that counted. Carson was derided by the Liberals as the
King of the Bluffers but since his bluff was never called, his
' i
26probable reaction remains m  the realm of conjecture.
; ■ ■ i 
■: 1
23Churchill, Churchill, 453, \{
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' Douglas L. Savory, "Edward Henry Carson" in the Dictionary
of National Biography (1931-194-0), ed. by L. G. Wickham Legg (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1949), 146-147. \
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Edward M a r j o n b a n k s , Carson, the Advocate (New York: The
Macmillan Company, 1932), 418-419.
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Another important member of the opposition was F. E. Smith,
a skilled debater and a personal if not a political friend of Winston
27Churchill's, who once described himself as Carson’s "galloper”
(a ranker's derisive term for aide-de-camp). After an initial stance 
of intransigence, Smith (later Lord Birkenhead) relented and tried
op
to work behind the scenes for a compromise on Home Rule. Another 
member of Bonar Law's shadow cabinet was Lord Landsdowne, a peer who 
had large holdings in Southern Ireland, who was against Home Rule 
not because of Ulster, but because he denied the whole concept of a
pa
seperate Irish nation. Sir James Craig, unquestionably an Ulsterite
(his ancestral home was on the outskirts of Belfast), helped Carson
• l 30
organize the Unionist Clubs and the Orange Lodges. Other prominent
*■‘•4. s 0-1
Unionists were Lord Milner and Dr. Jameson (of: the raid).
, 4
%
» \
In the War Office * '
-■ ■ - -     ■;
The position of Commander-in-Chief had been abolished in 
1904 and the administration of the War Office vested in an Army 
Council, headed by the Secretary of State for War and composed of 
four senior military officers and two Members of Parliament. An
27Sir Claud Schuster, "Frederick Edwin Smith" in the Dic­
tionary of National Biography (1922-1930), ed. by J. R. H. Weaver 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1937), 785.!
^^Ibid. ^ B lake, Bonar L a w , 157.
•^Clifford King, The Orange and the Green (London: Mac­
millan & Co., Ltd., 1965), 15. Hereafter cited as King, Orange and 
Green.
Ryan, Mu tiny, 122.
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imperial general staff on the German model was established in the 
32same year. The Chief and the Adjutant-General of the Imperial
General Staff were, ex officio, members of the Army Council and
figured significantly in the Curragh Incident.
Field-Marshall Sir John French, who would later gain fame
as commander of the British Expeditionary Force in France during the
Great War, was Chief of the Imperial General Staff in early 1914.
Born in Kent in 1852, the son of an officer of the Royal Navy, he
was educated at Eastman’s Naval Academy in Portsmouth, but chose a
military over a naval career. Beginning as a member of the militia,
French joined the 19th Hussars of the regular establishment in 1874.
He was a detachment commander in the unsuccessful effort to raise
the seige of Khartoum in 1884 and later commanded a regiment in
India. In 1914, however, his reputation rested on his record in the
South African War. In a splendid cavalry action, French’s command
raised the seige of Kimberly in February, 1900. After the war ended
„ he held various home commands where he was generally concerned with
the training of troops. In 1912, he was assigned to the War Office
33and was promoted to Field-Marshall in 1913. French was not an
32Harry Bendorf, "Richard Haldane and the British Army Re­
forms, 1905-1909," Unpublished Master’s Thesis (Omaha, Nebraska: 
Municipal University of Omaha, 1967), 22.
33He rman Gaston de Watteville, "John Denton Pinkstone 
French" in the Dictionary of National Biography (1922-1930), ed. 
by J. R. H. Weaver (London: Oxford University Press, 1937),
319-321.
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intellectual; abstractions bored him. His one passion was the army;
34
he had no strong feelings about Home Rule or Ulster.
The Adjutant-General, Lieutenant-General Sir Spencer Ewart, 
was a quiet, reflective Scot who had also won renown in the South 
African War. Born into a family with a military tradition stretch­
ing back to the Peninsula War, he graduated with honors from Sand­
hurst and served with distinction in Egypt and the Sudan. Passed 
out of the Staff College, Ewart served in Malta and again in Egypt 
before going to South Africa. He was twice mentioned in dispatches. 
From 1902 to 1914, Ewart held various positions at the War Office.
He was Haldane’s military secretary and George V's aide-de-camp be­
fore becoming Adjutant-General in 1914. He was fifty-three years 
35old. Ewart was deeply concerned about the army attitude toward
Ulster. He asked his aide, Captain Wyndham Childs, what that young
officer would do in an Ulster crisis. Childs said he did not intend
to consider his position until the matter reached the breaking point.
"What is that?", asked Ewart. "The movement of the rifle from
36’ready’ to ’present’", replied Childs.
Of the subordinate directorates within the War Office, 
three are important to the narrative of the Curragh affair. Major-
34Major the Hon. Gerald French, The Life of Field-Marshall 
Sir John French, First Earl of Ypres (London: Cassell and Company,
Ltd., 1931), 183, 194-195. Hereafter cited as French, French.
■^Charles V. Owen, "John Spencer Ewart" in the Dictionary 
of National Biography (1922-1930), ed. by J. R. H. Weaver (London: 
Oxford University Press., 1937), 293-294.
■^Ryan, Mutiny, 100.
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General Sir Henry Wilson was Director of Military Operations; Major- 
General Sir William Robertson was Director of Military Training and 
Major-General Sir Nevil Macready was Director of Personal Services.
Henry Hughes Wilson is described by A. P. Ryan as "the
37greatest intriguer who had ever worn the K i n g ’s uniform." Wilson 
was Irish, from an Antrim landholding family. His military qual­
ities were not evident in his youth, he failed twice to pass exam­
inations to gain admission to Woolwich and three times into Sandhurst. 
Like French, he began his career in the militia (where examinations 
were not required). Wilson transferred to the Royal Irish Brigade 
and then the Rifle Brigade; serving in India and Burma. At the 
Staff College, he was a poor student but made many friends. He had 
a gift for impressing influential people. Becoming a protege of 
Lord Roberts, Wilson advanced from Captain to Major-General in twelve 
years. He was a leading expositer of a policy of close cooperation 
with France in the event of a continental war. Wilson formed a 
close friendship with General Foch, the commander of the French 
superior staff college, when Wilson himself was the Commandant of 
the British Staff College in 1907. He was ordered to the War Office 
in 1910.38
3^Ryan, Mu tiny, 100.
38H erman Gaston de Watteville, "Henry Hughes Wilson" in the 
Dictionary of National Biography (1922-1930), ed. by J. R. H. Weaver
(London: Oxford University Press, 1937), 912-913.
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Wilson was a rampant Conservative and bordered on the fana­
tic when it came to Ulster. In conversation with Sir John French 
in November of 1913, Wilson said, "I could n’ot fire on the North 
at the direction of Redmond, and that is what the whole thing• 
means. . . .  I cannot bring myself to believe that Asquith will
be so mad as to employ force. It will split the army and the Col-
39 ■ .onies, as well as the country and the Empire." Wilson advised 
French to put in writing that he (French) could not be responsible 
for the whole of the army in the event of action in Ulster.4(~V
Wilson held almost daily conversations with Conservative 
politicians. His frequent telephone conversations and meetings 
with Bonar Law were the Conservative leader’s source of information 
on opinion in the army. Wilson told Bonar Law that "if we were 
ordered to coerce Ulster there would be wholesale defections."41 
He suggested to Bonar Law that Carson pledge the Ulster Volunteers 
to fight for England if she was at war; "This would render the
42employment of troops against Ulster more impossible than ever." 
General Wilson told the Unionists planning the campaign for the 
Ulster Volunteers to steer away from seizing depots in order to 
keep the sympathy of the British Army. Wilson lunched with Lord 
Milner, a stern, unbending Tory leader, at Brooks and was elated to
learn from Milner that, if any officers resigned, they would be
Major-General Sir C. E. Callwell, Field-Marshall S ir Henry 
Wilson: H i s Life and Diaries (2 vols.; London: Cassell and Company,
Ltd. 1927), I, 130. • Hereafter cited as Callwell, Wilson.
40Ibid«, 131. 41Ibid., 131 42Ibid.s 131.
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43reinstated when the Conservatives came to power. He was dis­
appointed when Lord Halsbury ruled against granting belligerent 
rights to Ulster in the event of civil war, w-i 1 .son heartily fav­
ored a suggestion that all Unionists in the Territorial Force 
should resign.44
Clearly Wilson subordinated his concept of honor to his 
political convictions. As the Director of Military Operations in 
a time of increasing continental tension, he was obligated to keep 
the army's professional troops removed from the political arena.
But his sympathy for Ulster overcame his sense of devotion to his 
larger duty. It never seems to have occured to him that the passing 
of information, advice and encouragement to the Unionist leaders, 
with the express purpose of depriving the government of the support
of the army in Ulster after the Home Rule Bill passed, was at
4*5least subversion and bordered on mutiny.
Major General Sir William Robertson, the Director of Mili­
tary Training, was a dour, phlegmatic soldier who had risen through 
the ranks from cavalry trooper to his present position by 1914. He 
was destined to become a Field-Marshall and Chief of the Imperial 
General Staff. Robertson was a clear-thinking, unpolitical pro­
fessional who viewed military men who indulged in political maneu­
vering with undisguised disgust. When he was asked by some uneasy
43Callwell, Wilson, 132.
44Ryan, Mutiny, 104. 43Kee, Green Flag, 486-487.
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officers what they should do in the event of an Ulster operation, 
Robertson told them to go away, quit thinking about it and get on 
with their w o r k . ^
The Director of Personal Services, Major-General Sir Nevil
Macready, had earned a reputation as a peacemaker by maintaining order
during a restive coal miners’s strike in South Wales in 1910. Colonel
Seely had praised him for avoiding a clash between the military and
4 .7the civil population. Macready was known to be an admirer of Sir 
Winston Churchill; like Churchill, he believed that firmness and 
resolute action were more effective than conciliation when there was 
a danger of civil unrest. But Macready was under no illusions. He 
writes, MTo be responsible for troops and police when engaged in 
the suppression of disorder is one of the most trying and disagreeable 
duties a soldier can be called upon to perform.
In Ireland
The General Officer Commanding the Forces in Ireland was 
Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur Paget whose command consisted of two 
divisions with two attached cavalry brigades. Only the 5th Division,
46Victor Bonham-Carter, The Strategy of Victory, 1914-1918;
The Life and Times of the Master Strategist of World War I: Field-
Marshall Sir William Robertson (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston,
1963), 79-80.
^Seely, Adventure, 152.
48General the Rt. Hon. Sir Nevil Macready, Annals of an Active 
Life (2 vols.; London: Hutchinson & Co., 1924), I, 157. Hereafter
cited as Macready, Annals.
39
commanded by Major-General Sir Charles Fergusson, and the 3rd Cav­
alry Brigade, commanded by Brigadier-General Sir Hubert Gough, had 
any part in the Curragh Incident. Paget’s headquarters were in the 
Royal Hospital, Dublin, while both the 5th Division and the 3rd 
Cavalry Brigade were headquartered at the Curragh, a large training 
encampment thirty miles southwest of Dublin, near Newbridge.^
Sir Arthur Paget, sixty-three years old, was a veteran of 
the Ashanti War of 1873, of Suakin and of South Africa. Paget was
ft
from an ancient family with a great military heritage and he en­
joyed high social standing. At one time he had gone about with the 
Prince of Wales (Edward VII) who affectionately called him "Artie.” 
Unquestionably gallant, he was prideful and self-centered. In re-
counting his campaigns, he would use such phrases as "So I massed
5Da thousand guns" and "then I launched my Guards." He claimed "to
51live history rather than to read it."
However gallant he may have been, Paget was a poor choice 
for command in an explosive civil situation. Under stress, he was 
not cool and clear-headed, but rapidly became tempermental and
r* ^
arrogant; he was unable to handle an emotional situation.-^ He was, 
like Gilbert and Sullivan’s "very model of a modern Major-General,"
49 50
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~*^ The Times (London), December 10, 1928, 19.
q p
Basil Collier, Brasshat; A Biography of Sir Henry Wilson 
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out-of-date, casual and intellectually shallow. He had deep-
54 • • 55seated prejudices against politicians and "Hibernians.” Through­
out his life his principal interests had been horse racing, hunting 
and golf, but since returning from the wars he had taken an almost 
obsessive interest in horticulture. When Paget died in 1928, the 
obituary editor of The Times could not resist mentioning that "had 
he only devoted to military study a fraction of the time which he
gave up to the observation of trees and shrubs he might have been
56ranked as a learned soldier."
If muddle-headed martinets like Paget open the military 
profession to invective and ridicule, balance is restored by ex­
emplary soldiers such' as Sir Charles Fergusson. Born in Edinburgh 
in 1865, Fergusson spent his adolescence in New Zealand where his 
father was governor. He graduated from Eton, passed out of Sand­
hurst with honors and was commissioned in the Guards. Becoming a 
Baronet on the death of his father, Sir Charles served for seven 
years in the Egyptian Command, winning distinction under Kitchener 
in the Sudan. After a series of staff assignments, and a tour as
Inspector of Infantry, he became commander of the 5th Division in 
571913.' Fergusson was a dedicated soldier with few interests outside
53 54Fergusson, Curragh Incident, 33. Ibid., 115.
^Covin, Carson, 338.
“*^ The Times (London), December 10, 1928, 19.
57 *Sir John Wheeler-Bennet, "Charles Fergusson" in the Dic­
tionary of National Biography (1951-1960), ed. by E. T. Williams and 
Helen M. Palmer (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), 353.
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the army. To the dismay and discomfort of some of its brigade offi-
5 8 'cers, the 5th Division maintained a high state of training. Fer­
gusson had no interest in politics and no personal interest in the 
Irish situation. He was dedicated to maintaining the strength and 
honor of the army.5^
Brigadier-General Sir Hubert Gough, also a product of Eton 
and Sandhurst, had once been the youngest captain, then the youngest 
commanding officer, and now was the youngest general (forty-three) 
in the British army. Later he would be the youngest Army commander 
in World War I. Gough served with distinction under Lord Roberts 
in South Africa. Executing a daring cavalry maneuver (in doing so 
he chose to disobey orders in order to capitalize on a fleeting 
opportunity), he was the first officer to enter Ladysmith after 
the raising of the seige. Gough was severely wounded in a sub­
sequent action. In service on the Indian Frontier, Gough had met
and quarrelled with a cabinet minister, one Winston Churchill, over
60
the application of cavalry tactics.
"Goughie," as he was known to his friends, was the personi­
fication of the dashing cavalry officer. He was short and wiry but 
looked exceptionally iA7ell on a horse. Unlike Paget, Gough was keen
CO
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ories; A Book of Recollections (Edinburgh and London: William
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and studious. His father died when Gough was an infant and he spent 
his formative years with an anti-Home Rule family in Clonmel, but 
he was not politically outspoken and evidenced no particular interest 
in the Ulster situation until it involved his command. In his 
biography, Gough writes that ". . . hunting, races and horse shows
were our chief amusement when we were not soldiering . . . None of
2us Cavalry officers were much interested m  Irish politics . . ."
One other military officer serving in Ireland deserves men­
tion, not because he was an active participant in the Curragh affair 
but, because he was such a perceptive observer. Brigadier-General 
Count Edward Gleichen was commander of the 15th Infantry Brigade, a 
part of the 5th Division. The 15th was not stationed at the Cur­
ragh but, in small elements, dispersed in and around Belfast in
Ulster. Gleichen, a grand-nephew of Queen Victoria, was an ex-
63Guards officer and a veteran of the Sudan and South Africa. His 
highly articulate, often witty, Memories provide a valuable account 
of what was happening in Ulster at the time of the Curragh Incident.
^Fergusson, Curragh Incident, 64-65.
62General Sir Hubert Gough, Soldiering On (New York:
Robert Speller and Sons, n. d. ), 98. Hereafter cited as Gough, 
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CHAPTER III
THE INCIDENT
Carson Bets, Churchill Calls
On December 16, 1913, Colonel Seely, the Secretary of State 
for War, held a meeting in the War Office with all the General Offi­
cers Commanding in England, Ireland and Wales. Seely had heard 
speculation that some officers might refuse to obey orders to march 
into Ulster and he wanted to establish a policy for dealing with 
such a possibility. Following are parts of the statement Seely 
made at the meeting:
I first deal with the legal question. The law clearly 
lays down that the soldier is entitled to obey an order to 
shoot only if that order is reasonable under the circum­
stances. No one, from general officer to private, is entitled 
to use more force than is required to maintain order and the 
safety of life and property. No soldier can shelter himself 
from the civil law behind an order given by a superior if 
that order is, in fact, unreasonable and outrageous.
If therefore, officers and men in the army are led to 
believe that there is a possibility that they might be called 
upon to take some outrageous action, for instance, to massacre 
a demonstration of Orangemen who are causing no danger to the 
lives of their neighbors, bad as might be the effects on dis­
cipline in the army, nevertheless, it is true that they are, 
in fact and in law, justified in contemplating refusal to obey.
But there never has been, and is not now, any intention 
of giving outrageous and illegal orders to the troops. The 
law will be respected and must be obeyed. What now has to be 
faced is the possibility of action being required by His 
Majesty's troops in supporting the civil power, in protecting 
life and property if the police are unable to hold their own.
Attempts have been made to dissuade troops from obeying 
laitfful orders given to them when acting in support of the 
civil power. This amounts to a claim that officers and men 
can pick and choose between lawful and reasonable orders, say­
ing that they will obey in one case and not in another.
43
44
The Army has been quite steady. During the past year 
there has not been brought to the notice of the authorities 
one single case of lack of discipline in this respect. At 
the same time, in view of statements in the press and else­
where, it is well to make the position clear.^
Seely instructed his generals to make this position clear to their
officers. The generals were to be held responsible for discipline
in their commands. Infractions were to be dealt with under the King's
regulations. Any officer asking to resign because he contemplated
2disobeying a lawful order, would be removed.
This statement borders on the unintelligible. While the use
of ambiguity to mask intentions or to shun responsibility is a time-
honored if not an admired strategem in military circles, these in­
structions were so conflicting as to be meaningless. A soldier 
could hot pick and choose between "lawful and reasonable orders," 
but under no circumstances would he be justified in obeying an "un­
reasonable and outrageous" order. Soldiers deal in violence and, by 
some definitions, all violence is outrageous. Seely did not explain 
how a soldier in a critical situation could determine if an order 
was "reasonable under the circumstances." A soldier is conditioned 
toward instant obedience. The responsibility for lawful and reason­
able orders lies with the giver, not the receiver. The Seely state-
3
ment must have left the generals more confused than reassured. And
^Pall Mall Gazette (London), March 25, 1914, 4.
^Ibid.
3Lady Violet Bonham-Carter, Winston Churchill as I Knew Him 
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one among them, Sir Arthur Paget, the General Officer Commanding 
the Forces in Ireland, was susceptible to confusion.
The government ministers became increasingly uneasy about 
the intentions of the Ulster Volunteer Force as the year 1914 pro­
gressed. Although the reports of British government agents in Ulster 
were often inconsistent and confusing, some intelligence indicated 
the Ulster Volunteers were gathering information on the Royal Irish 
Constabulary, the coastguard, the post office and the railway sta­
tions. The Ulstermen were said to be reconnoitering the meeting 
places of the Ancient Order of Hibernians and the United Irish League, 
two covert Irish Nationalist societies. Sir Edward Carson, the 
Ulster Unionist leader, was out inspecting his regiments. The Ulster 
Volunteer Force was said to have 110,000 men.^ The Volunteers now 
had machine guns, airplanes and ambulances. There was even a ladies’
•  - i  - i  5auxiliary.
Sir Henry Wilson, the Director of Military Operations in 
the War Office, visited Ulster in January, 1914. In his diary,
Wilson makes no comment on the condition of the army in which he 
served, but he gives glowing reports on the Volunteers after a visit 
to the Ulster Union offices in Belfast: "The arrangements of the
Ulster army are well advanced and there is no doubt of the discip­
line and the spirit of the men and officers. I must come over later
^Pall Mall Gazette (London), January 24, 1914, 3. 
^Pall Mall Gazette (London), March 2, 1914, 1.
46
6 " . .
and see the troops at work." In a War Office meeting m  early
February, Seely asked Wilson about the Ulster situation. Sir
Neney writes that he told Seely " . . .  the government are done.
They have bumped up against 100,000 men who are in deadly earnest,
and that, as neither the Cabinet nor Englishmen are ever in
7earnest about anything, Ulster was certain to win.”
In early March, the government made a last effort at com­
promise on the Home Rule Bill. With the reluctant consent of the 
Irish Nationalist leader, John Redmond, the Prime Minister, H. H. 
Asquith, offered an amendment which would allow, by plebiscite, 
any Ulster county to exclude itself from the operation of the bill
for six years. After that time, the county would automatically come
8under the provisions of the Home Rule Act. Carson, supported by 
Andrew Bonar Law, the Conservative and Unionist Party leader, re­
jected the proposal. He called it "a sentence of death with a stay 
of execution for six y e a r s . ( T h e  Irish Nationalists liked the pro­
posal no better than the Unionists; the nationalists said it would 
bring about/the dismemberment of Ireland.)10 Carson followed his 
rejection of the compromise with an appeal to the country against 
the elected government:
Callwell, Wilson, 137. Ibid., 138.
^Pall Mall Gazette (London), March 9, 1914, 1.
^The Times (London), March 10, 1914, 12.
■^Ryan, Mutiny, 116.
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Are you going to allow the forces of the Crown, which 
are your forces, not the forces of any political caucus, to 
be used to coerce men who have asked nothing but that they 
should remain with you? And if you are, are you going to give 
up, even for a moment, to a government which may be here 
today and gone tomorrow, the right yourselves to determine 
what is real liberty, ahd this to a government who have re­
fused, when asked, to appeal to the country?-^
Ronar Law and General Wilson discussed a scheme to have the 
House of Lords amend the Array Annual Bill (the Mutiny Act). Ini­
tially against the proposal, Wilson writes that Bonar Law "entirely 
persuaded me to his side. The proposal is for the Lords to bring 
in an amendment to the effect that the army shall not be used 
against Ulster without the will of the people expressed at a General
Election. . . .  I am convinced Bonar Law is right. Desperate
12
measures are required to save a desperate situation." Bonar Law
did not pursue this measure, however, when it threatened to cause
13a split m  his Conservative and Unionist Party.
The entire English political party system seemed to be 
tottering. Bitter accusations were exchanged in Parliament. The 
Conservatives accused the government of planning to massacre the 
Ulster Loyalists. The Liberals said the Tories were blatantly en­
couraging rebellion and urging army officers to reject their oaths 
of allegiance. German spies reported to Berlin that England was
-^Ryan, Mutiny, 117.
1 P
Callwell, Wilson, 138.
■^Blake, Bonar L a w , 186-187.
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riddled with factionalism and strxfe. Hope for a peaceful settle-
15raent of the Ulster questxon was dwxndlxng.
On March 6, the government considered action in response to
secret reports received from Ireland that the Ulster Volunteers
might be planning to mount a concerted attack on military and police
1 /•
barracks and arms and ammunition depots. Some hot-heads in the
Ulster Volunteer Force, the reports indicated, were going to take
17matters xnto their own hands and march on Dublin. The source of 
these reports is one of the unsolved mysteries of the Curragh In­
cident. After the incident, Asquith, pressed in Parliament, said 
the reports came from the police; that they were confidential and, 
f o r  security reasons, he could not produce them. The Prime Minister 
indicated that such reports had been coming in since December,
■jo
1913. ° The reports dxd not come from exther General Paget or Gen­
eral Gleichen, the senior army officers in U l s t e r . ^  It is un­
likely the reports came from the Royal Irish Constabulary. In a 
visit to Ireland in 1913, General Macready, the Director of Personal 
Services at the War Office, described the constabulary as demoralized
^ J a m e s  Cameron, 1914 (New York: Rinehart & Comapny, Inc.,
1959), 25. Hereafter cited as Cameron, 1914.
■^Churchill, Churchill, 470. ^Bonham-Carter, Churchill, 295.
^7Blake, Bonar L a w , 186-187.
18Fergusson, Curragh Incident, 25.
lyIbid.
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20and lethargic with an ineffective intelligence service. Whatever
the source, Asquith told the cabinet (and reported to the King) that
” the latest series of police reports * . . indicates the possibility
of attempts on the part of the ’volunteersr to seize by coups de
main, police and military barracks, and depots of arms and ammu- 
21nition." A committee, composed of Lord Crewe, Birrell, Churchill, 
Seely and Sir John Simon, the Attorney General, were designated by
p p
the Prime Minister to investigate and report.
Simon evidently took no part in the activity of the com­
mittee and Lord Crewe, appointed chairman to act as a restraining
23elder statesman, became ill and could not perform his duties.
Churchill and Seely, both more men of action than of contemplation, 
dominated the committee. Certain precautionary measures were dir­
ected even before the committee reported back to the cabinet.
Churchill and Seely found four particularly vulnerable depots and
instructed the War Office to take special measures for the depotsf 
24protection. Following are excerpts from orders sent by the War 
Office to Sir Arthur Paget on March 14:
20 21Fergusson, Curragh Incident, 26. Churchill, Churchill, 471.
22 •J. A. Spender and Cyril Asquith, Life of Herbert Henry Asquith,
Lord of Oxford and Asquith (2 vols.; London: Hutchinson, 1932), II,
42. Hereafter cited as Spender, Asquith.
23The Times (London), March 13, 1914, 6.
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Reports . . . have been received that attempts may be
made in various parts of Ireland to obtain possession of arms,
ammunition and other government stores, . . . You should at
once take special precautions for safeguarding depots and
other places where arms or stores are kept, . . •
. . « Armagh, Omagh, Carrickfergus and Enniskillen are
insufficiently guarded, being specially liable to attack. You
will, therefore, please to take the necessary steps and report
to this office.
Officers in command of all barracks where guns, small
arms, ammunition, and other government stores are located
should be warned that they will be held responsible that all
measures to insure the safety of the stores, etc., under their
custody are taken, and that at no time should barracks or
25buildings be left without adequate armed guards.
It was also decided that the Constabulary, scattered about Ulster 
in small detachments, whould be concentrated in Belfast under a 
single commander. There were few regular troops in Ulster; in 
fact, only elements of one infantry brigade under Brigadier-General 
Gleichen. Paget was told that, if the situation became critical,
2 6reinforcements would have to be moved from the Curragh into Ulster. 
After the committee deliberations and decisions on March 14, Winston 
Churchill journeyed to Bradford, in the West Riding of Yorkshire, 
and made a speech.
No historian or biographer of the time has been able to re­
frain from quoting large excerpts from Churchill’s Bradford speech.
In his autobiography, Asquith quotes Churchill’s peroration and 
states: ”1 am glad to be able to cull this vivid passage from the
slowly withering rhetoric of a now half-forgotten controversy, as a
^5Pall Mall Gazette (London), March 25, 1914, 4. 
26Churchill, Churchill, 471.
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proof, if proof were needed, that the twentieth century can hold
. . 27its own with its predecessors m  an oratorical competition.”
Ira Covin, Carson’s biographer, writes that the speech "was like
2o
the flash of a swofd suddenly drawn and brandished.” Churchill
spoke for a government that had diligently sought compromise, had
been rebuffed and derided, and now was lashing back. Asquith’s
final offer of temporary exclusion for Ulster, said Churchill, had
been a hard sacrifice for Irish Nationalism. Yet the Unionists
had rejected if and talked of violence. He called Carson’s Cove-
nanteers ”a self-elected body, composed of persons who, to put it
29plainly, are engaged in a treasonable conspiracy.” Was parlia­
mentary government, he asked, going to knuckle under to the menace 
of illegal force? That issue had already been decided at Marston
Moor. He warned the Ulsterites that the first British soldier killed
30by an Orangeman would cause an explosion m  the country. Mr.
Churchill denounced the selective anarchy of the Unionists and ended
his speech with a declaration daringly close to a battle cry:
As long as it affects working men in England or Nation- 
ist peasants in Ireland, there is no measure of military force 
which the Tory party will not readily employ. They denounce 
all violence except their own. They uphold all law except 
the law they choose to break. They always welcome the appli­
cation of force to others. But they themselves are to remain 
immune. They are to select from the Statute Book the laws they 
will obey and the laws they will resist.
27
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If Ulster seeks peace and fair play she can find it.
She knows where to find it. If Ulstermen extend the hand 
of friendship, it will be clasped by the Liberals, and by 
their nationalist countrymen, in all good faith and in all 
good will; but if there is no wish for peace; if every 
concession that is made is spurned and exploited; if every 
effort to meet their views is only to be used as a means of 
breaking down Home Rule, and of barring the way to the rest 
of Ireland; if Ulster is to become a tool in party calcu­
lations; if the civil and parliamentary systems under which 
we have dwelt so long, and our fathers before us, are to be 
brought to the rude challenge of force; if the government 
and the Parliament of this great country and greater Empire 
are to be exposed to menace and brutality; if all the loose, 
wanton, and reckless chatter we have been forced to listen 
to these many months is in the end to disclose a sinister 
and revolutionary purpose; then I can only say to you:
"Let us go forward together and put these grave matters to the 
proof.
Those Churchills had a way with words.
Paget and the War Office 
On Monday, March 16, Seely sent a message to Dublin asking 
Paget what had been done about the instructions in the War Office 
letter of March 14. The message also instructed Paget to come to 
London:
Please wire to me not later than 8 a. m. tomorrow (17th) 
what steps you have taken to carry out instructions in para­
graph 2 of War Office Confidential letter, dated 14th March, 
1914; also if the general instructions in paragraph 3 of 
the same letter have been issued. I shall be glad if you can 
come over, bringing with you full plans in detail, and meet me 
at the War Office at 10:45 a. m. on Wednesday, 18th M a r c h .32
Paget replied promptly that he had issued the necessary instructions
and "taken ail available steps." ^Will send details tomorrow by
33post," he wxred.
3~*~Thc Times (London), March 16, 1914, 13.
o o 3 3
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On March 17, Paget wrote a letter to the War Office which
indicated he had not, in fact, followed his instructions. In
December, 1913, Gleichen had sent Paget a long report recommending
34that no more troops be sent into Ulster. This report made the
Commanding General nervous about large troop movements and he
chose to move slowly. He ordered depot commanders to intensify
their security measures but he did not move troops north for the
3 3protection of the four depots mentioned m  his orders. He ex-
plained in a letter to the War Office: "I am of the opinion that
any such move of troops would create intense excitement in Ulster
and probably create a crisis. . . . I do not consider myself just-
ified in moving troops at the present time, although I am keeping
a sufficient number in readiness to move at short notice . . ." Paget
went on to say that ". . . there is no intelligence service in this
command . . .  so that I am placed at a considerable disadvantage in
• / 36attempting to judge the urgency of the situation . . .M This
sounds rather timorous for one who had massed a thousand guns. The 
gaps in General Paget’s information were filled in at the War Office 
meeting in London on March 18.
A very important meeting took place at 10:45 A.M. on Wednesday,
34Gleichen, Memories, 371-372.
^Covin, Carson, 308.
36The Times (London), April 23, 1914, 6.
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March 18, in the War Office. Assembled were Lord Crewe, Birrell,
37Simon, Seely, Churchill, French, Ewart, Macready and Paget.
Faced with this august array, General Paget readily agreed to move
the necessary troops into Ulster to protect the depots. Troops
would be moved from Dublin and the Curragh to reinforce the depots
at Omagh, Armagh, Carrickfergus and Enniskillen. In addition,
Paget was directed to safeguard the artillery park at Dundalk and
to send a detachment to Newry (Dundalk and Newry were not arms
38depots; Dundalk was not in Ulster.). Paget was ready to obey 
but he did suggest that it might be more propitious to evacuate 
the depots than to reinforce them. The government ministers did' 
not share his apprehensions. Birrell, the resident Irish expert, 
did not think the volunteers would fight as long as the troop move­
ments were not provocative, French disliked scattering the troops
39out in small detachments. The 1st Dorsetshire Regiment, stationed 
in Victoria Barracks, Belfast, was to move to Holywood. Supporting 
naval elements would steam off the northeast coast of Ireland to 
cover the troop movements. General Macready was to go to Belfast 
with a dormant commission, to be activated when he thought necessary, 
appointing him the military governor of that city. All these moves 
were to take place on Friday, March 20; to be completed on Saturday, 
March 21, "in all secrecy."^
37 3ftCallwell, Wilson, 139. Fergusson, Curragh Incident, 48.
39Callwell, Wilson, 139.
^°The Times (London), April 23, 1914, 6.
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As the General Officer Commanding in Ireland, Paget was 
given full discertionary powers to deal with new situations as they 
arose. He could maneuver the forces of his command as an emergency 
might require and he could call for large reinforcements from 
England if they were necessary. He was told he might have to face 
six possible situations, seperately or in combination: 1) Armed
opposition to the troops moving to reinforce the depots 2) Attacks 
on the depots or on the artillery park at Dundalk 3) The blowing 
up or destruction of railway lines 4) Serious conflict between 
Protestants and Catholics at Belfast 5) Disorder in the South and 
West with Catholics attacking Protestants 6 ) An organized movement 
of the Ulster Volunteers under their responsible leaders/'^ This 
was heady stuff for Paget, but he sent the necessary orders to his 
second-in-command, Major-General L. B. Friend, in Dublin:
Bedfords to move to places which have been decided. D
previous message had alerted 300 men to be ready to move to
Enniskillen, 100 men in two cruisers to Carrickfergus, 300
men to Omagh and 100 men to Armagh. 3  Battalion of 14th
Brigade to go to Newry and Dundalk. Battalion, Victoria 
Barracks, to go th Holywood with all ammunition and bolts 
of rifles if unable to move rifles themselves. These move­
ments to be simultaneous if possible and to be complete by 
dawn, Saturday, 21st, with all secrecy.^
The outcome of the War Office meeting on March 18 worried 
Sir John French and afterward he discussed it with his Director of 
Military Operations, Sir Henry Wilson. French railed about the
41Churchill, Churchill, 476.
4^The Times (London), April 23, 1914, 6 .
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cabinet ministers and told Wilson "they are contemplating scattering
43
troops all over Ulster, as though it were a Pontypool coal strike." 
French asked Wilson if the General Staff had a plan for the sup­
pression of Ulster and Wilson answered that none existed. Wilson 
went on to tell French that mobilization would be necessary before 
the army .could suppress Ulster and even then the outcome would be 
uncertain. According to Wilson, there were certain to be risings 
on the English side of St. George's Channel if Ulster were forced.
Wilson went on to say that "a large proportion of the dfficers and
men" would refuse to fight against Ulster. Wilson writes that
French "seemed surprised at all this," but French said the government
44
were determined to see the thing through.
The Conservatives and Unionists were not going to be sur­
prised; not while they had Wilson in the War Office. That very 
evening he dined with Lord Milner, Dr. Jameson and Carson . ^  Wilson 
does not admit he told his fellow diners about the War Office plans
but Carson's speech in the House of Commons on the following day
indicated knowledge of the movements that logically could have come
46 .
only from Wilson. Carson asked the government ministers to con­
sider the effect on the army of bringing it into armed conflict with 
Ulster. "Under your directions," he accused, "they will become
^Callwell, Wilson, 139.
44Ibid. 45Ibid.
4^The Times (London), March 20, 1914, 8 .
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assassins." "I feel," Carson went on, "that I ought not to be
here but in Belfast." Fearing arrest, he left the House for Euston
48Station and the train for the Belfast boat.
From Carson's manner and language in Commons, the government 
may have assumed that he planned to proclaim the provisional gov­
ernment upon his arrival in B e l f a s t . ^  This may have affected the 
deliberations that took place at the War Office on March 19. The 
conference on that day was longer than on the 18th; the ministers 
and the generals disagreeing on several points. No notes were kept 
of the conference and there is even some uncertainty over who actually 
attended. Certainly Seely, French, Ewart and Paget were there;
Macready was probably present. Churchill must have been there for 
50
a short time. The nature of the discussion can only be discerned 
by Paget's subsequent actions.
Paget, as he had pointed out in his letter of March 17, was 
concerned that the troop movements would be the cause of civil un­
rest. He also believed that there was a possibility that the em­
ployees of the Great Northern Railway would refuse to transport his 
troops from Dublin and the Curragh into Ulster. Most important, he 
was fearful that many of his officers would refuse to accept orders 
t o  participate m  active operations against the Ulster Volunteers.-^
41 Parliamentary Debates, 5th ser., Vol. 59 (2 Mar.-20 Mar., 
1914), 2277.
^8Covin, Carson, 313, 316. ^Blake, Bonar L a w , 188. 
^^Fergusson, Curragh Incident, 51. ~^Ibid., 51-52.
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The ministers must have tried to reassure their timorous general
on these points. If his troop movements were resisted or attacked,
he must have been promised necessary reinforcements. There is
no doubt that Churchill promised that naval vessels would be avail-
able to carry the troops by sea to Carrickfergus and Dundalk so
that neither detachment' would be dependent on railway transportation
and the unit bound for Carrickfergus would not have to march through
52the streets of Belfast. Paget was fairly carried away at one
point by all the talk of combined operations and large reinforcements.
Becoming excited, he exclaimed, like a reincarnated Jacobite, "I
shall lead my army to the Boyne IM This startled French, who told
S3him. not to be "a bloody fool.’*
The number of communications issuing from the Admiralty 
on March 19 gives a strong indication that Churchill had something 
more in mind than arms depot security. Orders were sent to the 3rd 
Battle Squadron, in Arosa Bay, off Portugal, to steam at ordinary 
speed to Lamlash, in the Firth of Clyde, opposite Belfast. The 
Commander of the 3rd Battle Squadron, after clearing Ushant, was to 
proceed in the flagship directly to Plymouth; he was to proceed 
overland to the Admiralty in London for further orders, then over­
land to Lamlash. His flagship was to proceed direct from Plymouth 
54to Lamlash. The senior naval officer at Bantry in County Cork was
52
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directed to send the two light cruisers, H. M. S. Attentive and
Pathfinder to Kingston with orders to arrive by noon on the twentieth.
The Attentive was to pick up a company of the Bedfordshire Regiment
and then both ships were to steam to Belfast bough. The Pathfinder
was directed to cooperate with the senior military officer at
Carrickfergus Castle for its defense. Guns and searchlights from
the ships were to be used as necessary. The Captain of the Path-
finder was to proceed, in civilian clothes, to Belfast and report
to General Macready, who would be in place by then, for "cooperation
55with the military m  certain eventualities.” A destroyer was dis­
patched from the 4th Flotilla at Portsmouth to Dublin to take a- 
board the General Officer Commanding in Ireland, if necessary. The
des t r o y e r  captain was to report, in civilian clothes, to the Royal
56
Hospital, Dublin. All of these orders were sent out in a one- 
half hour period, from .1:57 P.M. to 2:32 P.M., on March 1 9 . ^
Later on the nineteenth, at nine o ’clock that evening, the cruisers,
-H. M. S. Gibraltar and Royal Arthur, were directed to steam from 
Plymouth to Kingston, where they would each embark 275 infantrymen
CO
and transport them to Dundalk by the morning of March 20. Finally, 
the Commander-in-Chief of the Home Fleet was directed to send eight
^5Pall Mall Gazette (London), April 23, 1914, 2.
~*^ The Times (London), April 23, 1914, 6 .
^Ryan, Mu t iny, 127.
^^The Times (London), April 23, 1914, 6.
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destroyers from Southhampton to join the 3rd Battle Squadron at 
59Lamlash, It was indeed a busy day at the Admiralty.
Paget's final concern was the behavior of his officers if
they were ordered to march into Ulster. Colonel Seely, apparently
prodded by French, finally agreed to some concessions with regard
to officers actually domiciled in Ulster. Those officers could be
exempted from any operation that might take place. They should be
allowed to "disappear” and when all was over they would be allowed
tor resume their places without their careers or positions being 
60affected. Any other officers should not be permitted to resign 
their commissions but, if they refused to obey orders, should be
ZT "1
dismissed from the army. Paget left for Dublin by the night 
mail.
A great deal had happened during two days of conferences. 
Troops on the borders of or in Ulster had been reinforced by two 
infantry battalions. Belfast was to be placed under a military 
•governor. General-Paget was given full discretionary powers to use 
h r i s  forces for the protection of arms depots and the prevention of 
civil disorder. He had been promised large reinforcements from 
England if he needed them. Paget had, or soon would have, naval 
support from seven battleships, four cruisers and nine destroyers. 
Officers who attempted to resign their commissions if ordered into 
Ulster were to be dismissed from the army with indulgence shown
59
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only to those officers actually domiciled in Ulster. But all this
w a s  in the form of oral instructions; Paget left London without
. 62 a single written order.
Gough Won ’ t Go
Sir Hubert Gough was startled, early in the afternoon of 
Thursday, March 19, to hear that the troops at the Curragh, at the 
direction of Headquarters in Dublin, had been issued extra rounds 
of ammunition. About the same time his wife received a note from 
Sir Charles Fergusson’s wife. The note stated that the Fergussons 
would not be able to keep a dinner engagement with the Goughs that 
evening because Sir Charles was busy issuing orders for the move­
ment of several division units. Gough began to feel uneasy. Some­
thing was up. He wrote a quick letter to his brother, Sir John 
Gough, who was Chief Staff Officer to General Sir Dcmglas Haig at 
Aldershot. ’’What the devil is up?,” Sir Hubert asked. Later in 
the day another order came from Dublin. Gough, Fergusson and every
general within reach was to attend a conference with the Commanding
63General at Dublin on Friday morning.
That meeting in Dublin on Saturday morning was the start of 
the Curragh incident. As at the War Office no notes were taken; 
Paget forbade notes. Attending, beside Fergusson and Gough, were 
Brigadier-General S. P. Rolt, Commander of the 14th Infantry Bri­
gade; Brigadier-General G. J. Cuthbert, Commander of the 13th
62Fergusson, Curragh Incident, 55.
63
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62
Infantry Brigade; Colonel F. F. Hill, commander of the regimental
depots in the northern counties and Major-General I. B. Friend,
64Paget’s deputy. Both Gough and Fergusson wrote accounts of the 
meeting soon after it was over. The accounts do not differ in any 
essential respect. Both agree that Paget’s opening statement lacked 
coherence.
Paget began the meeting by saying the situation might appear
theatrical but was really very serious. Active operations were
• 65about to commence against Ulster. "The whole place," he said,
66"would be in a blaze by Saturday." Precautionary measures had 
already taken place. There were warships in Belfast Lough, Kingston 
and Lamlash. Troops would be moved north in the event of a dis­
turbance. If there were disturbances an enormous force would be 
deployed to convince Ulster that resistance was futile . ^  He had 
full discretionary powers with an army of reinforcements at his 
call. Paget reminded his generals of a speech he had made at the 
Corinthian Club in Dublin three weeks earlier. At that time he had 
said that, although the army would hate to move north, if the order 
were given it would be obeyed without hesitation. He had said the
army had a stern sense of discipline and would do their duty. The
. 68
•speech had been widely quoted in .the newspapers. Paget had ap-
- °Tergusson, Curragh Incident, 65. 1 r
^^Gough, S o l d i e r i n g 101. ' ; j
■ 66
Pall Mall Gazette (London), March 23, 1914, 2.
67 . .
Ryan, Mutiny, 131.
G^PalT Mall Gazette (London), February 14, 1914, 4.
63
parently forgotten that all he had really been ordered to do was to
move two battalions and one company of infantry and re-group some
others- This could have been done without excitement; without talk
of "active operations against Ulster” and ”the whole place being in
a blaze.” Sir James Fergusson (General Fergusson’s son), in his book.
The Curragh Incident, speculates that Paget was ’’hearing trumpets
69and smelling battle afar off.”
Paget did emphasize that no aggressive act on the govern­
ment* s part must start the conflict- If there was going to be 
fighting, the Ulstermen must begin it. He repeated over and over 
again that there must be no agression on the part of the troops.
He expected them to accept punishment without returning fire in
70hope that a parley could be arranged and government terms accepted.
The Commanding General proudly announced that he had, with 
Sir John French’s help, secured the following concessions from the 
Secretary of State for War:
First: Officers actually domiciled in Ulster would be
exempted from taking part in any operations that might take 
place. They would be permitted to ’’disappear” (that being 
the exact phrase used by the War Office) and when all was 
over would be allowed to resume their places without their 
position or career being affected.
Second: Officers who stated they were unwilling to
serve might tender their resignations, but these could not 
be accepted. And officers doing so would forthwith be re­
moved from the service.71
The brigade commanders were directed to put these alternatives to
y Q
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their officers. "Domiciled in Ulster" was to be strictly interpreted,
Paget announced that if any general present at the meeting was not
willing to do his part, he was not to report to the second conference,
scheduled for Saturday afternoon. Decisions were to be prompt and
the number of officers not prepared to do their duty must be reported
by that evening. Paget told Gough a squadron of cavalry was to be
ready to march north by the next morning. He went on to say, "Tell
your men to trust me and I will guarantee that there will be no 
72bloodshed." But, he added, he was no prophet and, once embarked
73on the enterprise, they must go through to the "bitter end."
Turning again to Gough, Paget said, "7You may expect no 
mercy from your old friend at the War Office'--meaning Sir John 
French." This caused Gough to "put ;up his hackles." Why, Gough 
wondered, had he been singled put. to be .threatened?^. The meeting .
ended on that note. r ; ' '"7; '  ‘ y.".y;. y 7 ‘ - ■
Fergusson and Gough talked immediately after the meeting. 
According to Gough, Fergusson was agitated; pale and trembling.
Fergusson said, "The army must hold together; we must not break
75 ~
up the army, etc." Gough says, "I did not argue. I listened.
Fergusson went away saying he had decided to g o . I- said I would -
not go."76 . ■ ■ ■
^Ryan, Mutiny, 132-133. ~ ~ ’.«= -"v. r. /-.-/.-.i
^Gough, Soldiering, 102. ^ Ibid., 101.
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Fergusson drew up a memorandum of the meeting for his unit
comraanders, stating the terms that were to be put to the officers,
and sent it to the Curragh. Gough telegraphed his brother John at
Aldershot, telling him of the Paget alternatives and that he
(Hubert) was resigning from the service. Sir Hubert then went to
Knightsbridge where the 5th Lancers (a squadron of the 3rd Cavalry
Brigade) were quartered. He collected the available officers, told
them of the alternatives, and said that every man must decide for
himself. All of the Lancer officers except three said they would
77
resign with their Brigade Commander. Returning to Headquarters, 
Gough told General Friend of his decision. Friend asked him if he 
could not look upon the operation as an effort to maintain law and 
order. Gough said he could not; it might develop into civil war 
at any time. Friend then told the cavalry commander to send in a
yo
letter of resignation. Gough returned to the Curragh.
Paget’s second conference was held at two o ’clock at the
Royal Hospital. There was much controversy later about what he
said. Again notes were forbidden and again Fergusson wrote an
account of the meeting after it was over. Fergusson, Friend and
Major-General Pultney, Commander of the 4th Division stationed in
79the South of Ireland, attended. Friend explained Gough's absense
OQ
and Paget expressed regret.
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The plan of campaign was outlined. If there was a disturb­
ance in Ulster, the 3rd Cavalry Brigade was to seize bridgeheads on
the Boyne. The 5th Division would advance and consolidate these
positions. The 6 th Division would move from the South into the
positions vacated by the 5th Division in Dublin and at the Curragh. 
The 1st Division from Aldershot would reinforce the 5th Division. 
Three infantry battalions from Scotland, with supporting artillery, 
would land in the North and garrison points forming a ring around
Belfast; L a m e ,  Ballymena, Lisburn, Holywood and Bangor. A naval
81brigade was to land at Bangor. Paget again said there must be no
act of aggression. There was to be no firing unless personally
authorized by Paget. If troops were molested or their progress
otherwise impeded, they were to return to their barracks. The
troops from England and Scotland were for demonstration only. All
measures were precautionary; to be ready if the Ulsterites got
82out of hand and attacked the police.
Back at the Curragh, General Gough polled the rest of his 
brigade, acknowledged a request for clarification from his officers 
and sent the following minute to Paget;
With reference to the Communication from the War Office 
conveyed to me verbally by the Commander-in.-Chief this morning, 
I have the honour to report the results of my interviews with 
the Officers of ray Brigade.
The officers are of the unanimous opinion that further 
information is essential before they are called upon at such 
short notice to take decisions so vitally affecting their 
whole future, and especially that a clear definition should be 
given of the terms "duty as ordered" and "active operations" 
in Ulster.
ft lCovin, Carson, 331-332. 82Ibid., 332.
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If such duty consists of the maintenance of order and 
the preservation of property, all the officers of this brigade, 
including myself, would be prepared to carry out that duty.
But if the duty involves the initiation of active mil­
itary operations against Ulster, the following numbers of 
officers by regiments would respectfully, and under protest, 
prefer to be dismissed:
Brigade Staff, 2 officers.
4th Hussars, 17 out of 19 doing duty.
5th Lancers, 17 out of 20 doing duty.
16th Lancers, 16 out of 16 doing duty.
3rd Brigade, Royal Horse Artillery, 6 out of 13 doing 
duty, "including R. M. ”
4th Field Troop, Royal Engineers, 1 out of 1 doing duty.
3rd Signal Troop, Royal Engineers, 1 out of 1 doing duty.
'N In addition, the following are domiciled in Ulster and • 
claim protection as such:
4th Hussars, 2 officers.
5th Lancers, 1 officer.
3rd Brigade, Royal Horse Artillery, 2 officers.
Gough’s absence from the second conference, a meeting between Paget 
and Colonel Parker of the 5th Lancers, and this letter prompted the 
messages to the War Office on the defections (see page 1).
Fergusson took a different tack in response to Paget's 
directive to poll the officers in the 5th Division on their will­
ingness to serve against Ulster. At Paget's second meeting, Fergusson 
asked if the orders came from the King. Paget replied that he would 
not have accepted the orders if they had not had the sanction of the 
King (Not that it really mattered, but King George did not even know 
about the War Office orders to Paget. Technically, they had the King's
sanction since they were issued by the government.). Fergusson used
84this asserted sanction to good effect. Back at the Curragh, he 
assembled the staff officers of the Royal Engineers and the Service
o o
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Corps had asked for their decisions. They all said they hated the 
use of troops against Ulster and resented the way in which their de­
cisions had been demanded on short notice but said they would, under
protest, do their duty if ordered. A report of these decisions was
8 5forwarded to Paget along with G ough’s minute.
Saturday, March 21, was a day of almost frenzied activity
for Fergusson. He began by seeing General Rolt and exhorting this
wavering officer to hold his units together. The example of the
3rd Cavalry Brigade was known and many other officers were ready
to resign. Fergusson spoke personally to the officers and men of
the 21st Suffolk Regiment and the 2nd Battalion of the Manchester
Regiment. The soldiers evidenced strong feelings and resentment
86
but there were no resignations. Many of the junior officers
were shocked and indignant. They wrote emotional letters home;
some of which were later printed in newspapers and used by Bonar
87Law in the House of Commons. Next, Fergusson saw Gough and tried 
to dissuade him from resigning. According to a witness, Gough 
looked uncertain but said he had gone too far to turn back. Re­
luctantly Fergusson, following,Paget’s orders, ordered Gough, Col­
onel Parker of the 5th Lancers and Colonel MacEwen of the 16th 
Lancers to report to London in accordance with the War Office tele-
, -• » 8 8  : .Vgram (see page 1 ).
p  r
Fergusson, Curragh Incident, 90. Ryan, Mutiny, 144-145.
87Pall Mall Gazette (London), March 24, 1914, 1.
O O
Fergusson, Curragh Incident, 117.
69
Fergusson went to Kildare and Newbridge to talk to his 
artillery units. There were painful scenes but less resentment and 
no resignations. Fergusson made similar but not identical remarks 
to all units. He said the first duty of soldiers was to obey the 
orders of the King and of constitutional authority. This order (the 
forced choice between dismissal or duty in Ulster) was the K i n g ’s; 
issued with his sanction. Officers were told of their responsibility 
for influencing juniors and subordinates. Personal considerations 
must give way to their duties as commanders of troops. They must not 
be a party to anything that weakened discipline. Officers could not 
refuse to obey the present orders and still expect their men to obey 
when they— on strike duty, for instance--were placed in similar dif­
ficulties. If the army was disrupted, the country would be at the 
mercy of the mob. Society, the Monarchy and the Empire might be 
shattered. Fergusson repeatedly emphasized that no aggressive 
measures were contemplated. Use of the K i n g ’s name was most effective.
Loyalty to the King was the determining factor in inducing most of-
89ficers to withhold their resignations.
A lot depended on how the ultimatum was presented. Colonel 
Turner, Commander of the Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry, whose 
advance units were already enroute to Dundalk and Newry, had no 
resignations. "Active operations in Ulster” did not alarm his u n i t . ^  
Fergusson went on to Dublin and convinced the officers of the 1st 
East Surrey Regiment and the 13th Infantry Brigade to not resign.
8^Ryan, Mutiny, 145-146. ^Fergusson, Curragh Incident, 84.
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The King's Own Scotch Borderers, previously stationed in Holywood
but now in Dublin, were not unwilling to fight Orangemen but the
suddenness of the ultimatum antagonized them and ten officers chose
d dismissal. Fergusson talked them out of it.9 '*' Ry the end of the
day on Saturday, March 21, General Fergusson, after a magnificetit
effort, could report that, except for a few Ulster-domiciled
officers and one or two waverers, the officer corps of the 5th
Division was intact and ready for duty. The resignations in response
to the ultimatum were effectively confined to the 3rd Cavalry Brigade.
About the time General Ewart in the War Office was reading
Paget’s first telegram ("Fear men will refuse to move” ), the first
news of the Curragh situation reached Fleet Street. An Exchange
Telegraph message from an Irish correspondent stated that word had
been received at the Curragh from, the War Office that any officer
not prepared to serve against Ulster must immediately send in their
92resignations or be dismissed from the service. About one hundred
93officers, another story said, had turned m  their papers. The
rumors about the resignations of the cavalry officers appeared in
94The Times on Saturday morning. There was also an accurate article
v
about the movement of troops. A battalion of Bedfords had been
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moved from Mullingar to Enniskillen. Another detachment of Bedfords
had arrived at Armagh. The Duke of CornwallTs Light Infantry was
at Newry. The garrison at Dundalk had been doubled. The article
went on to say that Sir Arthur Paget had been given wide authority
to safeguard government property and to keep order. Inaccurately,
the article stated that the War Office had not specifically directed
95the movement of troops into Ulster.
Paget went to the Curragh on Saturday morning to make a per­
sonal appeal to the cavalry officers. The accounts of this meeting, 
by Gough and other officers, indicate that Paget was near hysteria.
In an inconsistent, disjointed harangue, the Commanding General 
pleaded with the cavalry officers to trust him and he promised they 
would not be placed in any objectionable positions. He had no in­
tention of making war on Ulster. Units would be moved only for the 
protection of stores. The movements were, in fact, directed mostly 
against "Hibernians" (an arabigious term; to Paget it probably 
meant those affiliated, in fact or in spirit, with the Ancient Order 
of Hibernians, a secret society of radical Irish Nationalists.).
The depot at Enniskillen was dangerously exposed to Hibernians. The 
hills around Dundalk were peopled with Hibernians. Any clash with 
Ulster men would he avoided. If any battalion met resistance, it 
was to turn around and go back into barracks. If fighting took 
place, he would order his men to lie down and not return the fire, 
while he and his generals went forward to parley with the Ulsterites.
^ Thfe Times (London), March 21, 1914, 8.
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The cavalry would not be required to take any serious part. He 
would use them only as scouts and to protect his lines of com­
munication. The scouts need not fire a shot; just supply him 
information. They need take no part in an actual engagement. He
did, however, expect the cavalry squadrons to hold the line of the
96Boyne while 25,000 reinforcements were brought over from England.
Turning from conciliation to threat, Paget said he expected 
only a ’’few religious fanatics” to accept dismissal. If officers 
liked to ’’indulge in the luxury of sentiment” they must pay for 
it. No resignations would be accepted. Defecting senior officers 
would be tried by Court-Martial. He told the cavalry officers they 
were disobeying the direct order of their sovereign. He would never 
have agreed to the orders if he had not known it was the K i n g Ts 
wish. He asked the officers if they thought he would obey ’’those 
dirty swine of politicians.” Paget finished this remarkable ad­
dress by directly confronting Gough and telling the cavalry general
that he could expect no mercy. Gough coldly replied that he did
Q7not ask for mercy. No resignations were withdrawn. Paget dir­
ected Gough, Parker and MacEwen to hand over their commands, cross
to London that night and report to the War Office the following 
98morning.
9^Gough, Soldiering, 103-104.
97Ibid., 104-105.
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Gough to London 
Rumors had begun to circulate in the political circles of 
London as early as Friday night, March 20. "The fleet has been 
ordered to Belfast and Sir Arthur Paget is to be reinforced with 
60,000 t r o o p s T h e  ubiquitous Henry Wilson was called to meet 
with Brigadier-General John E. Gough at the Gough home in Sloane 
Square. John had learned that his brother Hubert had just been 
dismissed from the service because he would not undertake opera­
tions against Ulster. John Gough stated he was going to resign 
in sympathy, but Wilson told him to wait. Later that evening,
someone telephoned Wilson that all the officer's {of the 16th Lan-
!
cers had resigned. f I
■ * ■!
Wilson was in Bonar L a w ’s office by nine-thirty Saturday
I
morning. He told Bonar Law that Hubert Gough and about fifty officers 
at the Curragh had resigned rather than move against Ulster. After
I
getting an agreement from the Conservative leader that it was im-
I
perative to back Hubert, Wilson went on to the War.Office for 
several meetings with Sir John French. French did not appear to be
, i
aware of the gravity of the situation. Wilson told French the
, ' i
breakaway of the Curragh officers was just the beginning; the Gen­
eral Staff would break away n e x t H e  urged French to ask the 
.Prime Minister to take immediate action to placate the Curragh
j
officers before there was a general defection. 'French discussed
, J1 -■ .j
V \
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the matter with Colonel Seely. Seely was inclined toward direct 
and speedy action--court-martial, etc.--but asked what terms the 
army would accept. French then asked Wilson to draft a proposal 
for the reinstatement of the Curragh officers.*^
Wilson wrote out a promise on the part of the government 
"not to employ the army to coerce Ulster to accept the Home Rule 
Bill” and to reinstate Hubert Gough and all his officers. French 
took the paper to Seely but, very soon, brought it back. Wilson 
remarks, ffI gathered it was not popular with Asquith and his crowd.” 
French arranged a meeting between Wilson and Seely at seven o ’clock, 
Saturday evening. It began with polite, banal exchanges. Seely 
even thanked Wilson for the way he had behaved during the past two 
years; particularly when he knew Wilson’s sympathies were with 
Ulster. Wilson then presented a briefing on the Curragh situation 
and the liklihood of wholesale resignations within the army. If 
Gough and his officers were not reinstated, there would be ”no 
officers on the General Staff at the War Office; the regiments 
w o u l d  be depleted of officers.” England would be facing a 
’’hostile Europe; our friends leaving us because we had failed them 
and our enemies realizing we had lost our army.” Despite this im­
passioned appeal, ’’Seely remained untouched.” Wilson went straight 
from Seely to another meeting with Bonar Law. He writes in his
diary that he was determined to resign but ’’cannot think of a good
- . . ,,102 way of doing it.”
101Callwell, Wilson, 140. 102Ibid., 141.
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King George, in whose name Paget and Fergusson--with vary­
ing success--were urging their officers to hold together, found 
out about the crisis when he read the morning papers on Saturday.
He promptly called Seely and had some sharp words with the Secre­
tary for War. Lord Roberts came to see the king. The elderly 
Field-Marshall was in despair; he said the crisis "would ruin 
the army." Next King George sent for Sir John French and impressed 
upon the taciturn Field-Marshall that "if great care were not shown
there would be no array left." The king wrote a well-justified
. \
letter of complaint to Asquith, expressing indignation at the free
105way m  which his name had been used. ;
Hubert Gough arrived at his mother’s flat in Sloane Square
on Sunday morning, March 22. He was met by his brother John with
- |
news that the War Office would take the line that there had been 
a complete misunderstanding; that Paget’s alternatives should 
never have been put before the officers and that they were to be 
reinstated. Hubert was not placated; he was now thoroughly a- 
roused. Suspicious of his superiors, both civilian and military, 
he was determined to resign. The Gough brothers went to the War 
Office where they met Parker and MacEwen. All of them agreed they 
would not return to their commands if they were liable to be exposed 
again to the situation forced on them by Paget. ■ And they were not
I
^ ^ N i c h o l s o n , George V , 238.
■^^Gough, Soldiering, 105.
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prepared to undertake war on Ulster. Hubert Gough gave General
Wilson a written account of Paget’s conference in Dublin on March 
20. Wilson wrote in his diary, "This is a perfect God-send for me." 
'He could now say that, given the same alternatives, he would give 
the same answer. Wilson promptly sent a copy of Hubert G o u q h ’s
report to Bonar Law, telling Bonar Law to freely use what Paget
, , . , 105had said.
Brigadier-General Gough, without his colonels, was ushered 
into a meeting with Generals Ewart and Macready. He was stiff and 
correct, determined not to submit to a lecture or a "wigging." He 
writes that he was conscious of no offense but filled with resent­
ment over' the cruel and hard position forced upon him by Paget and 
the War Office. Ewart asked Gough what had happened at the Cur­
ragh. After Gough had replied, Ewart asked Gough if he thought "an 
officer had any right to question when he should go or should not 
go in support of the civil powers." Gough answered promptly, "None 
whatever," but added that he had never been ordered by Paget to go 
in support of the civil power. Paget had offered two alternatives 
of which Gough had accepted one. This ended the interview.
Gough was told to stay in London within reach by telephone. Parker 
and MacEwen had seperate interviews. Colonel F. F. Hill, commander 
of the regimental depots in the north of Ireland who had attended
105
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the first meeting with Paget on March 20, was also with the Cavalry
107officers in their confrontation with the War Office generals.
Gough now felt he was in a very strong position and he re­
solved that "I would not return to my command unless I was given 
a guarantee in writing that neither I nor my officers would be ex­
posed again to being ordered to impose Home Rule on Ulster, I was
not really a very interested Ulsterman, but I felt the army was
108being made a pawn in the political game, . . ."
Mr. Asquith spent a busy weekend on the twenty-second and 
twenty-third of March. After being briefed by Seely, The Prime 
Minister saw the legal aspects of the situation were not as im­
portant as keeping the army together. He was chagrined that Paget 
had been authorized to question the officers in Ireland on how they 
would react under hypothetical circumstances. The officers had been 
asked to decide questions that were the province of the government.10^ 
Rather testily, he pointed out to his Secretary for War that officers 
should not be asked to choose between their military duties and their 
political convictions, but simply given orders. The Prime Minister 
directed Seely to reach a settlement with the officers from the 
Curragh before the House of Commons met on Monday, March 23.'11'(0 On 
Sunday Asquith gave a statement to The Times; to be published on 
Monday. The statement was incomplete and, in part, inaccurate ;
■^^Ryan, Mutiny, 150-151. ^^^Gough, Soldiering, 106.
■^^Parliamentary Debates, 5th ser., Vol. 60 (23 Mar-8 Apr., 
1914), 419. —
■^■^Covin, Carson, 341-342.
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but this may not have been deliberate. He stated that the troop move­
ments in Ireland were purely precautionary and intended only to safe­
guard arms depots. Naval movements consisted of two small cruisers 
dispatched to convey a detachment of troops to Carrickfeiyus so they 
would not have to march through Belfast. No further troop movements 
were contemplated. The Ulster leaders were not going to be arrested. 
There was not going to be an inquisition into the intentions of the 
cavalry officers if they were asked to take up arms against Ulster. 
"The employment of troops against Ulster is a contingency which the 
government hopes may never a r i s e . M r .  Asquith was trying to 
cool off an explosive situation. He did not know that a top general 
on the Imperial General Staff was briefing the opposition leader 
on every unpublicized development.
The Prime Minister also had a few words with the First Lord 
of the Admiralty, Mr. Churchill. The King had written Asquith on 
the twenty-first about " . . .  some excitement caused . . . i n  Ire­
land by the movements of some ships and I have heard nothing from 
the First Lord of the Admiralty . . ." Questioned, Churchill told
Asquith for the first time about the movement of the 3rd Battle
112Squadron and the Southampton destroyers. Asquith ordered both
movements cancelled. The destroyers put back into Southampton and
1 i q
the battle squadron was directed back to Portuguese waters. :: .
i
lllphe Times (London), March 23, 1914, 1-2.
"*■ ^ C h u r c h i l l , Churchill, 481.
113Covin, Carson, 340.
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Later, when questioned about the changing of the fleet orders, As ­
quith,’ with masterly aplomb, said, "In view of the prevelant excite­
ment in the country, and the fact that the precautionary measures 
in Ireland had been peacefully carried out, I suggested to Churchill 
that the movement of the ships should be delayed.
Hubert Gough had breakfast with Wilson at the latter*s 
home in Eaton Place on Monday, March 23. They both agreed that any 
government proposals must be in writing and stipulate that General
l i e
G o u g h  would not be asked to use his troops to coerce Ulster. J 
At the War Office, Gouch talked with General Sir Douglas Haig who 
had come up from Aldershot to offer encouragement to the cavalry 
general. At 11:15 that morning Gough met with French and Ewart. 
French said, " . . . a great misunderstanding.” Gough replied, "No
misunderstanding on my part, Sir.” French directed, "You are to 
return to your commands as if nothing had happened." Gough replied, 
"I am quite willing to do that, but such a grave crisis has arisen 
that neither I nor the officers can return unless we receive a def­
inite assurance that we shall not be asked again to enforce on Ulster 
the present Home Rule Bill.” French immediately replied that he 
could give such an assurance. Gough demanded the assurance in writ­
ing. French asked, "Is my word not good enough? L e t ’s wipe every-
116thing off the slate and go back to Thursday evening." The answer
to the question was no. Gough writes in his autobiography, "I had 
no faith in Sir John French’s promises, but I did not want to say
114Churchill, Churchill, 481.
^^^Callwell, Wilson, 141. ^^Ryan, Mutiny, 152-153.
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sol" The cavalry general continued to hold out for a written
assurance. French said it was impossible; Gough refused to return
without it. Finally, after a long and painful silence, French
said, "There is nothing for it but to take him before the Secretary 
118
of State." In the hallway enroute to Seely’s office, French made
a last appeal, "For G o d ’s sake, go back and d o n ’t make any more dif­
ficulties; you d o n ’t know how serious all of this is. If you d o n ’t 
go back all the War Office will resign. I have done my best for you 
If they had attempted to penalize you, I would have resigned myself.’ 
Gough said he was "awfully grateful."
Paget was with Seely when Gough, French and Ewart entered 
the Secretary's office; evidently he had been summoned from Ireland 
on Sunday. According to Gough, Seely expressed extreme hauteur; 
was stiff with French and Ewart, glared at Gough. Gough was struck 
by the submissive attitude of French, Ewart and Paget. Seely began 
a pompous harangue. His manner varied from extreme truculence to 
fawning paternalism. He gave a long discourse on the relationship 
of the military to the civil power; emphasizing that to maintain 
law and order the civil power was justified in using the necessary 
force. Gough writes that the remarks of the Secretary were a sum­
mary of the Preamble to the Army Act. Gough listened attentively, 
fearful that Seely would attempt to put him in a disadvantageous 
position. Seely finished his remarks by saying that the Prime
117Gough, Soldiering, 107. 1^8Ibid.
3 19Ryan, Mutiny, 153.
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Minister had just stated the government was not planning to coerce
Ulster and that such an assurance should be sufficient for Gough.
Gough replied that under ordinary circumstances this would be true
but, such grave misunderstandings had arisen, that he felt he must
have the promise in writing. Seely became very indignant and said
no soldier would be allowed to dictate to the government. Gough
120
merely repeated hxs request. There was another one of those
painful silences.
French rescued Seely and removed the impasse by suggesting 
that Gough would not be able to keep the respect of his subordin­
ates unless he could show them a written assurance. Gough writes 
that he knew this was nonsense but he was willing to accept it be­
cause it gave Seely a chance to extricate himself. So Gough "hast-
121ened to thank Sir Jonn French for his explanation.” Seely's
manner was still very condescending but he said this put the re­
quest for a written assurance in a new light and he added that 
there should be no .difficulty in drawing up a satisfactory memor­
andum. Paget agreed. Ewart was tasked to draft the memorandum;
122Gough was to return for it at four o'clock that afternoon.
Ewart, perhaps with French's help, quickly drafted the mem­
orandum and sent it to the cabinet for approval. The cabinet had 
begun discussion of the draft when Seely had to leave for an audience 
with the King. When he returned the cabinet meeting was breaking
1 2 0  . 1 2 1
Gough, Soldiering, 108. Ibid.
122 Fergusson, Curragh Incident, 110*
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up and Asquith handed him the amended document. After reading the
memorandum as amended by the cabinet, Seely felt some additions were
necessary if the document was going to satisfy Gough and his officers.
For some unknown reason, he felt empowered to make the suitable ad- 
123ditions.' Lord Morley, who was still m  the room, helped Seely
frame and append two additional paragraphs. Seely might hot have
been a principled man but Lord Morley was and it is amazing to find
124him conniving with Seely to tamper with a cabinet paper. But
later Lord Morley bravely admitted his responsibility.
Before the four o ’clock meeting Sir Douglas Haig called on 
Sir John French to warn that, if Gough were punished, every officer 
in the Aldershot command might resign. French had H a i g ’s warning 
on his mind when he received the cabinet document from Seely. Both 
French and Ewart added their initials to Seely’s on the bottom of 
the document and, about four-thirty, the document was handed to
■J O C
Gough. ~ In its completed form (the first three paragraphs from 
the whole cabinet;' the last two from Seely and Morley), it read 
as follows;
You are authorized by the Army Council to inform the 
officers of the Third Cavalry Brigade that the Army Council 
are satisfied that the incident which has arisen in regard 
to their resignations has been due to a misunderstanding.
It is the duty of all soldiers to obey lawful commands 
given to them through the proper channels by the Army Council, 
either for the protection of public property and the support
12 2 .Parliamentary Debates, 5th ser., Vol. 60 (31 M a r .-8 Apr., 
1914), 416-417.
^^Blake, Bonar L a w , 197.
^•^Fergusson, Curragh Incident, 150-151.
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of the civil power in the event of disturbances or for the 
protection of the lives and property of the inhabitants.
This was the only point it was intended to put to the 
officers in the questions of the General Officer Commanding, 
and the Army Council have been glad to learn from you that■ 
there never has been and never will be any question of dis­
obeying such lawful orders.
His Majesty’s government must retain their right to use 
all the forces of the Crown in Ireland, or elsewhere, to 
maintain law and order and to support the civil power" in the 
ordinary execution of its duty.
But they have no intention whatever of taking advantage 
of the right to crush political opposition to the policy or 
principles of the Home Rule B i l l .^ 6
Gough asked permission to study the document. This made 
French very impatient. He said the King was waiting to learn if 
the matter had been settled. Gough said it was important to pre­
clude any further misunderstanding. Gough, his brother, Parker,
127MacBwen and Wilson studied the document. Wilson and Gough
approved of the memorandum except for the last paragraph. The
128phrase "crush political opposition" could be variously interpeted. 
Gough took a sheet of War Office stationery and, with Wilson’s help, 
wrote the following: "I understand the reading of the last para­
graph to be that the troops under our command will not be called 
upon to enforce the present Home Rule Bill on Ulster, and that we
12Qcan so assure our officers. H. P. Gough." Taking Parker and
MacEwen with him as witnesses, Gough returnes to French’s office. 
French had been waiting in great agitation. Gough observed that 
the Field-Marshall’s hands were shaking. When Gough read from the
126p aii Mall Gazette (London), March 24, 1914, 4.
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paper the interpetation he and Wilson had placed on the ambigious
phrase, French considered for a moment and then said, "That seems
all right.” He took a pen and wrote on the bottom of Gough’s
130paper, "That is how I read it. J. F.” Gough and his colonels
shook hands with French and Ewart, said good-bye and crossed to 
Dublin on the night mail. Wilson felt sure the government would 
object to the fifth paragraph of the memorandum. It constituted 
a definite promise on the part of the government. He was also sure 
that French would be in trouble for agreeing to it. Although he 
gave no advice or information to his immediate superior, Wilson 
promptly informed Bonar Law of all that had taken place. It had
been a busy day.
At 5:00 P.M. on March 23, General Wilson assembled the 
officers of his directorate and briefed them on the situation. A 
major on Wilson’s staff, one Archibald P. Wavell, wrote down, in 
a letter to his father, his impressions of Wilson’s remarks. Wilson 
told his assembled officers that General Gough and his colonels were 
going back to Ireland with a signed pledge that the army would not 
be used against Ulster. The statement that Wilson and Gough had 
written and French had initialed was read to the group. Wavell 
writes that the attitude of a majority of the assembled officers 
was that the army had won a great victory. But he does not agree. 
The army had won a political battle and political victories by the
^30French, French, 194. 
131Callwell, Wilson, 142.
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army might destroy the political stability of the country. Wilson 
was openly jubilant over the events. "He actually said, ’The 
Army have done what the opposition failed to d o f and ’will probably 
cause the fall of the present government.1" Wavell found this 
deplorable. "What right," he wrote, "have the army to be on the 
side of the opposition, what do they have to do with causing the 
fall of the government?" "How," he continued, "is the country 
going to take that state of affairs?"
132John Connell, Wavell: Scholar and Soldier (London,
Collins, 1964), 87. Hereafter cited as Connell, Wavell.
CHAPTER IV 
IMPACT AND AFTERMATH
House of Commons
In the House of Commons on Monday evening, March 23 (the
day Sir Hubert Gough received his written assurance and returned
to Ireland), the government ministers were attacked from both sides
of the aisle. The opposition accused them of trying to use the
armed forces to provoke violence and give the government forces an
excuse to shoot down Ulstermen. The Liberal members railed about
"playboy cavalry officers" who allowed their political views to
overcome their sense of duty and discipline. General Paget was
quoted and misquoted. Bonar Law brought forth letters from officers
asserting that more than merely protective operations (as Asquith
had claimed) were planned.1 Arthur Balfour accused Asquith of plan-
2m n g  to coerce Ulster and then losing his nerve. Ramsey MacDonald
remarked that the Syndicalists had not been able to sell their
doctrines to the Labour Party but apparently had made some headway
3w i t h  the Tories. A Syndicalist Manifesto was read into the record. 
Addressed to the enlisted men of the British Array; it reminded them
1
Parliamentary Debates, 5th ser., Vol. 60 (23 M a r .-8 Apr., 
1914), 73.
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that their officers had exercised an option about obeying orders
4and asked the men to resolve never to fire on their own class.
The anti->government speeches showed two conflicting points
of view; either there had been a wicked government plot or the
cavalry officers had gone on strike. John Ward, a Socialist returned
as a Labour member for the Potteries, raised the "men on horseback”
specter. "We have . . .  to decide whether we are going to maintain . .
civil authority and law within these realms, or whether . . . this
House, when elected by the people, must go to a committee of officers
and ask that Military Junta . . . whether it is a subject, which they,
as officers of the Army, think that we, as representing the people,
5are entitled to interfere."
In vain, the government tried to explain and minimize the 
incident. Colonel Seely, with Asquith, outlined the troop move­
ments and asserted that all orders had been punctually and im­
plicitly obeyed.. The movements, Seely said, were purely protective 
and there had been no intention of moving the 3rd Cavalry Brigade.
No plans existed or were being considered for conquering or intimi­
dating Ulster. Brigadier-General Gough had misunderstood his in- 
• s'tructions but this misunderstanding had been resolved and Gough 
was on his way back to Ireland to resume his duties (In fact, at the 
very moment Seely was speaking, Gough and Sir John French were still
4Parliamentary Debates, 5th ser., Vol. 60 (23 M a r .-8 Apr., 
1914), 120.
5Ibid.} 119-120.
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discussing the meaning of the phraseology in the government memor­
andum that cleared up the misunderstanding). No reinstatement was 
necessary because no officers had been deposed.^*
Bonar Law, supplied with extensive confidential government 
information by Sir Henry Wilson, did not accept the explanations of 
the ministers. The opposition leader quoted General Paget’s ulti­
matum. He referred to Paget’s remark that Ulster would be "in a 
blaze by Saturday.” Information from other commands, Bonar Law 
asserted, indicated large numbers of officers intended to resign.
"Our army is being destroyed before our eyes,” he said, "over the 
government plot to conquer Ulster.” Bonar Law quoted Churchill’s 
Bradford speech as proof of government intentions to use force in
'*v
Ulster. How, he asked, could the Curragh officers be punished for
refusing to move against their own countrymen? Precedent, the Tory
leader^ claimed, had been established during the American Revolution
for officers opting out of service in a civil war. The scruples of
officers refusing to serve against.the American colonies had been
respected; why not the scruples of officers refusing to serve against 
7
Ulster? It was a bad evening for the government.
Some foreign views on the Army-Ulster situation appeared 
in The Times on Tuesday morning, March 24. From Paris, a corres­
pondent wrote the crisis had given ”a painful impression” of. the 
state of British politics. A Berlin newspaper called the crisis
6
Parliamentary Debates, 5th ser., Vol. 60 (23 M a r .-8 Apr., 
1914), 73, 82.
7Ibid., 73, 79.
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one of "the perils of democracy." The Times already had accurate 
news of Gough’s written assurance: "The troops under his command •
will not be used to coerce the people of Ulster into acceptance of
Q
the Home Rule Bill." Asquith and Seely must have been startled 
to read that article.
In the War Office, Major-General Robertson tried to convince 
Sir John French that the government would never accept the adden­
dum to the cabinet memorandum that Gough had composed and French 
had initialed. French would not listen; he had not yet told Seely 
of the addendum when news of it appeared in The Times. Wilson 
hastened to report all this to Bonar Law. Wilson, like some oily 
lago, assured French that--though the Field-Marshall would probably 
be dismissed when the government found out about the added assurance
given to Gough--there was no need for worry. The Army would stick 
g
by him.
As it became apparent the government was avoiding giving 
full details, belief grew in the country that some sort of govern­
ment plot had been thwarted by the action of the army officers. In 
the House of Commons, on March 24, neither Seely or Asquith would 
answer opposition questions about Gough’s written assurance. A s ­
quith denied any knowledge of destroyer movements from Southampton 
to Belfast Lough. John Ward, with telling sarcasm, asked, "Is it
^The Times (London), March 24, 1914, 7-8. 
^Callwell, Wilson, 142-143.
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proposed to ask General Gough to form a government?"^ An editorial 
in The Times stated there was good evidence that the War Office had 
planned an attack on Ulster and the attack was prevented only when 
large numbers of officers chose dismissal. Citing Bonar Law's 
speech in Commons on Paget's ultimatum, the editorial speculated 
that f’a frank soldier artlessly blurted out the whole project to 
his brigadiers and colonels, instead of deftly disguising the real 
interests of the government." What could cause, the editorial con­
tinued, "the whole place to be in a blaze by Saturday," except a 
deliberate attempt to provoke the Covenanteers?^
The government issued a white paper on March 24 that con­
tained a selection of documents and telegrams but no fleet orders 
were included. Unfortunately for the government, General Wilson, 
on that same day, found out about the Churchill orders sending the 
3rd Battle Squadron and two flotillas to Lamlash. From there,
Wilson surmised, the naval contingents were "to make a regular
Jameson raid on some Ulster stronghold." Only the Army action,
12Wilson felt, had prevented a naval incursion. Bonar Law and the 
press were promptly informed and when Commons met on the 25th, 
the government white paper was derided as inaccurate, incomplete 
and misleading. Sir Charles Beresford asked, with obvious accurate 
knowledge, about the fleet orders and their cancellation. Churchill 
replied that it had been decided two weeks earlier to send a battle
TOParliamentary Debates, 5th ser., Vol. 60 (23 M a r .-8 Apr., 
1914), 204-207.
•^The Times (London), March 24, 1914, 9.
12Callwell, Wilson, 142.
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squadron to Lamlash; to be there in the event of disorder. The
movement of the squadron had been cancelled on March 21 because the
precautionary troop movements had been completed without incident.
Mr. Amery accused Churchill of hoping the precautionary measures
would lead to fighting and bloodshed. Churchill called this a
13"hellish” insinuation.
Bonar Law, at the same sitting on the 25th, asked about the
additions to the Gough letter. Asquith replied that the document
was drawn up to allay uneasiness in the officers1 minds about the
hypothetical questions put to them by General Paget. The Prime
Minister said it was incorrect to put hypothetical questions to
the soldiers and it was further incorrect for soldiers to ask for
14written assurances from their government. The two paragraphs added 
by Seely and Morley, Asquith said, were subject to misunderstanding 
and were repudiated by the government.^ Later, he also repudi­
ated the Gough-French written agreement. Asquith saw that note as 
a new claim which, if allowed, would place the government and the 
country at the mercy of the army. The government would never yield, 
the Prime Minister said, to the claim of any body of men in the ser­
vice of the Crown, to advance options of what they would or would
-1 XL
not do in circumstances that had not arisen. He added that General
13Parliamentary Debates, 5th ser., Vol. 60 (23 Mar -8 Apr., 
1914), 378-380.
■^Asquith, Fifty Years, 168.
15Parliamentary Debates, 5th ser., Vol. 60 (23 Mar-8 Apr., 
1914), 419-420.
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Gough had been informed that the two added paragraphs were not to 
be considered as operative . ^
What had Paget really said? What were his orders? Bonar 
Law asked the questions but he already knew the answers. Asquith
J  Q
admitted Paget had no written orders. ' Seely added that it had
initially appeared that Gough and the others had denied Paget's
authority and for that reason they had been summoned to London.
When Paget had said "in a blaze" he had meant the press would be
in a bla2e, Seely explained. Seely admitted he had made a grave
19error m  adding to the cabinet document and offered to resign.
Arthur Balfour questioned the government's grounds for the pre­
cautionary moves. He suggested their purpose was to maneuver 
Ulster into an offensive. Notwithstanding the government's re­
pudiation, Balfour personally approved of the "peccant paragraphs.” 
Austen Chamberlain asked if anyone believed that Paget would put 
such questions and make such statements without authority?2*9 The 
government made no immediate reply to either Balfour or Chamberlain.
The Army
The cabinet memorandum given to Gough was published in the 
white paper, but not the Gough-French agreement. Wilson wired
17Asquith, Fifty Years, 168.
18Parliamentary Debates, 5th'ser., Vol. 60 (23 M a r .-8 Apr., 
1914), 376.
19Ibid., 395-401.
20Ibid., 411-, 496.
»C1*J 1,1 “
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Hubert Gough to ’’stand like a rock” and then hurried into strategy
21sessions with Bonar Law, pursuant to bringing down the government.
Returning to the War Office, Wilson urged French, since the Field-
Marshall Js promise to General Gough had been repudiated, to resign.
The rest of the army would hold as long as no action was taken
against Gough. French offered to resign but, for the moment, Seely
would not allow it. According to Wilson, all the Commanders-in-
Chief and the division commanders notified French that the army
would not fight Ulster. Wilson was exultant but thought French
and Ewart should resign in the interest of army solidarity. The
cabinet was trying to keep French in place in order to minimize
22the extent of the army’s uneasiness.
Early in the week of March 22, Lord Haldane announced in 
the House of Lords: "No orders were issued, no orders are likely
to be issued, and no orders will be issued, for the coercion of 
Ulster.” Now Haldane sent for French and told the Field-Marshall 
that the Prime Minister had agreed to let the Haldane statement 
stand. This statement in effect colaborated the Gough-French agree­
ment. French wrote a letter to Gough stating that, although the 
government would not recognize the Gough-French concordance, the
Haldane statement was now recognized government policy. French
23showed this letter to Haldane and Asquith before it was sent.
Pursuant to his goal of keeping the army intact and respon­
sive (This was, after all, 1914 and it looked like there euuld soon
21Callwell, Wilson, 143. 22Ibid., 144. 23Ibid., 143-144.
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be more vital employment for the army thaii putting down civil dis­
turbance in Ulster.), Asquith, hoping to avert future Curragh Inci­
dents, issued an Army Order on Discipline:
No officer or soldier should in the future be questioned 
by his superior officer as to the attitude he will adopt, or 
as to his action, in the event of his being required to obey 
orders dependent on future or hypothetical contingencies.
An officer or soldier is forbidden in future to ask for 
assurances as to orders which he may be required to obey.
In particular, it is the duty of every officer and sold­
ier to obey all lawful commands given to them through the 
proper channel, either for the safeguarding of public property, 
or the support of the civil power in the ordinary execution 
of its duty, or for the protection of the lives and property 
of the inhabitants in the case of disturbance of the peace.
Wilson called the order "ridiculous" and continued to urge French
to resign.
Lord Milner once remarked, "They talk a lot about Gough but 
the man who saved the Empire is Henry Wilson." Whatever Wilson 
was trying to save, it was not Sir John French. French, still 
wavering on resignation, composed a letter to the Prime Minister.
In giving the assurance to Gough, French wrote, he had thought he 
was carrying out the instructions of the government; he had no 
idea of soldiers dictating to the cabinet or to Parliament. French 
inserted a paragraph approving of Asquith’s order on Discipline but 
Wilson talked him into deleting it. In the final paragraph, French 
stated he believed the government would not coerce public opinion
24Asquith, Fifty Years, 167.
Z5Callwell, Wilson, 144. 26Ibid.
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in Ulster and that there would be no active operations in Ulster.
For these reasons, French contemplated no action against Gough;
nor would he make any effort to recover the concordance, which Gough 
27still held. This was not enough. Asquith again repudiated the
Seely addendum and the French-Gough concordance.
On March 30, the Prime Minister accepted the resignations
of Seely, French and Ewart. Asquith became his own Secretary of •
State for War; he held the additional office until the early days
of World War I, when he relinquished it to Lord Kitchener. Asquith
told his new charges: "The Army will hear nothing of politics from
me and, in return, I expect to hear nothing of politics from the 
2 Rarmy." Although Wilson still maneuvered to bring down the govern­
ment, many officers, including Gough, approved of Asquith’s move.
They considered Asquith "a gentleman, honest and straightforward,
29. . .  with t h e  interests of the Army at heart." Sir Charles
30Douglas and Sir Henry Sclater succeeded French and Ewart.
In a speech at Ladybank, in Fife, on April 4, Asquith
quoted and endorsed the doctrine laid down by Pitt, the Elder, in
the House of Commons, in 1745:
The right of inquiring what measures may conduce to the 
advantage and security of the public, belongs not to the Army, 
but to this House. To this House belongs the power of con­
stituting the Army, or of advising His Majesty with regard to
^Callwell, Wilson, 144-145.
^^Asquith, Fifty Years, 170. ^ G o u g b , Soldiering, 110. 
30Callwell, Wilson, 145.
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its constitution. Our Armies have no better right to deter­
mine for themselves than any other body of men, nor are we to 
suffer them to prescribe laws to the Legislature, or to govern 
those by whose authority they subsist.
The Prime Minister should have made the doctrines of the Elder Pitt 
required reading for Sir Henry Wilson.
Although the soldiers were still uneasy, routine was return­
ing to the Curragh and the other army camps. Affairs at the War 
Office were resuming their normal course. Wilson, still convinced 
that he and Gough had thwarted a government plot, discussed with 
Lord Milner the importance of making the cabinet reveal what orders 
had been given to Paget. "The disclosure of the orders will abso­
lutely abolish the cry of ’the people versus the army’ and will ruin
Winston, Lloyd George, Birrell, Seely and (I think) Asquith,1' Wilson
32 . . . .notes in his diary. Wilson went to France m  mid-April to explain
to General de Castelnau exactly what happened at the Curragh in 
connection with Ulster. The singular situation that had arisen in
Ireland--particularly the army's involvement--attracted a great deal
. . 33of attention in France and, indeed, all over the continent.'
Brigadier-General Gough and his regimental colonels were 
welcomed as heroes when they returned to the Curragh. Gough gave 
a speech in which he said that soldiers, as well as other men, had 
the right to follow the dictates of their consciences. The reluc­
tant general received a great deal of fan mail--most of it from
^Asquith, Fifty Years, 169-170. 
32Callwell, Wilson, 146. 33lbid.
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Ulster. The government asked that the cabinet memorandum be re­
turned but Gough refused, saying he had deeded the document in trust
O  A
to his eldest daughter. Gough facetiously complains, in his
autobiography, that his role as a hero of the Ulsterites was very
35short-lived. ” . . .  I was soon replaced by Henry Wilson!”
Major-General Sir Charles Fergusson, whose magnificant ef­
fort .halted the spread of the defections, found himself in trouble 
with his sovereign* Lord Stamfordham, George V fs secretary, wrote 
a letter to General Fergusson sharply criticizing him for assuring 
his officers that Paget’s orders had been fully approved by the King. 
Stamfordham had received a letter from an Infantry colonel of the
5th Division who told the secretary that he and his officers under-
36stood "the King had given the order, and we one and all obeyed."
The King, in fact, had known nothing about the orders or the problem
they created until he read the morning paper on Saturday, March 21.
The King resented his name being used so freely; without his
37knowledge or consent. Fergussonfs soldierly qualities did not
preclude a knowledge of the constitution; he replied, respectfully
but firmly, that he felt orders coming to him from his superiors were
technically from the King and, as such, merited respect and obedi- 
38ence. Even General Paget, scolded by the King on this same subject,
^Gough, Soldiering, 110. ~^*Ibid.
Fergusson, Curragh Incident, 174-175.
^Nicholson, George V , 238.
38 Fergusson, Curragh Incident, 175-176.
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39said, "All orders to the Army were the King's orders." Fergusson 
offered to resign. Stamfordham quickly replied, saying the king 
had reconsidered Fergusson's action and had decided the general had 
been correct in that he did what he was told, and urged Fergusson 
not to resign.4^ The army continued to settle down but there was a 
vague uneasiness in the relations between the military commanders 
and the government ministers. Morale suffered; suspicion spread 
and rumors were ripe.
Ulster
Ulster was quiet. Ulster had been quiet throughout the 
41crisis. The Saturday on which Ulster was to be " m  a blaze" passed
in complete calm at Holywood and Belfast. When Major-General Mac-
ready arrived in Belfast with his dormant commission as military
governor, he was greeted by Brigadier-General Gleichen, who reported 
42all was well. In the first week of April, the Dorset Battalion
moved, without incident, from Holywood back into Victoria Barracks.
The officers of Gleichen's infantry brigade, stationed in the heart
of Ulster and almost certain to be the first troops involved if an
iln-cident occured, were never presented with Paget's ultimatum--to
• 43choose between operations m  Ulster and dismissal.
3Q .Nicholson, George V , 238.
40Fergusson, Curragh Incident, 177.
41
The Times (London), April 23, 1914, 6 .
4? A O
'Gleichen, Memories, 376-377. Ibid., 380.
99
The Plot
The opposition and the Conservative press continued to in­
sist a sinister government plot to coerce Ulster had been foiled by 
the Army crisis. Asquith was pressed in Commons about the confi­
dential reports on the danger to the arms depots, but he refused to 
make them public. Colonel Seely announced that his resignation had 
been necessary--not because of the failure of a plot to coerce
Ulster but--because he had, although it had not been his intention,
44
made a bargain with serving army officers. Churchill said the 
military and naval movements to protect the arms depots were made 
"to eliminate temptation;" not to provoke disturbances. The gov­
ernment insisted that Paget had not been ordered to force alterna-
4 Stives on his officers. The opposition still talked of a plot;
of Churchill’s Bradford speech; of Paget’s "blaze." F. E. Smith
asserted that a Napoleonic scheme had been concocted, "but there
46was no Napoleon." Churchill retorted that, if ..the Bradford 
speech was provocative, what about some of Bonar L a w ’s and Carson’s
t
47speeches? Bonar Law demanded a written account from General
Paget on the orders he had received and what he had said to his
officers on March 20. The government agreed to publish a second,
4 ftmore complete white paper in late April.
^^Parliamentary Debates, 5th ser,, Vol. 60 (23 M a r .-8 Apr., 
1914), 836-841.
45Ibid., 893-902. 46Ibid., 877. 47lbid., 905.
48Ibid., 978.
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On April 4, a huge Tory-organized demonstration in Hyde 
Park protested the use of the army and navy against Ulster. Four­
teen platforms were built between the Serpentine and Bayswater Road. 
Twenty-two processions marched in the West End streets. Supporters 
wore badges inscribed "Support Loyal Ulster." Fiery speeches en­
dorsed the resolution: "We protest against the use of the Army and
Navy to drive out by force of arms our fellow subjects in Ireland 
from their full heritage in the Parliament of the United Kingdom.
And we demand that the government shall immediately submit this 
grave issue to the p e o p 3 _ e . " ^ 9  The speeches were filled xvith ac­
cusatory bombast; mostly against Churchill. Robert Cecil claimed 
Churchill "contemplated the slaughter of hundreds of thousands of 
his fellow men." Sir Charles Beresford called Churchill "a Lilliput 
Napoleon, a man with an unbalanced mind, an egomaniac."^ Even
51Arthur Balfour was there; his first and last Hyde Park speech.
Mrs. Drummond took advantage of the crowd to stage a militant suf-
52fragist counter-demonstration.
For all the demonstrating and press speculating, a more 
restrained aura prevailed in the House of Commons in the first week 
of April. Balfour said the main problem was "how, with decent credit 
to ourselves, we can avoid the national calamity of civil war." 
Referring to the more subdued temper of the House, Balfour said this
49
Fall Mall Gazette (London), April 4, 1914, 1.
50Ryan, Mutiny, 164. ^Cameron, 1914, 23.
~^Pall Mall Gazette (London), April 4, 1914, 1.
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c o
did not mean they were agreed but that they were frightened.
Even Carson appeared to be searching for a compromise. He offered 
to submit to the voters of Ulster a proposal that would leave-after 
the six-year exclusion period— to the Imperial Parliament to deter­
mine what would happen to the excluded counties. But he still re­
fused to accept the automatic inclusion of Ulster after six years
54and this was as far as the government would go. The Home Rule
Bill passed its second reading (for the third time) with a majority
55of eighty on April 6 .
The debate on the "Plot" started up again in the House of
Commons on April 20. The opposition asked for a judicial inquiry
into the crisis. The government refused, saying there had been
56no arraignments and none were planned. Asquith denied that Paget 
had been directed to pass on his orders verbally. The direction to 
his officers to take no notes had been at Paget’s initiative; not 
the government’s. Paget had been given no written orders other than 
those on March 14. ~*7 Again asked to publish the reports that led 
the cabinet to believe the arms depots were about to be seized, A s ­
quith again refused. He did agree, however, to an opposition request
5 ofor an expanded white paper. He acknowledged that the outlying 
stations were not given the ultimatum. Pressed about the fleet
“*^Ryan, Mutiny, 3.64. ~^Ibid. , 164-165.
5 ^ Covin, Carson, 355.
56Parliamentary Debates, 5th ser., Vol. 61 (14 Apr.-l May, 
1914), 578.
57Ibid., 578-579. 58Ibid., 580, 582.
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orders, Asquith said he found out about them on March 21 and 
"suggested” they be cancelled. Mr. Amery reminded the Prime 
Minister that, if that were the case, the statement that Mr.
59Asquith had given to The Times on March 22 contained an untruth.
A second white paper was released on April 23. It con­
tained fifty-five documents, including the fleet orders, compared
60
with eight documents in the original paper. Also included was 
a statement by Paget concerning the meetings in Dublin on March 
20.' Government ministers worked with the general for some time to 
get a coherent account of what he thought he said to his generals. 
Paget wrote that he had been misunderstood by his generals; that 
he had no intention of ascertaining the intentions of subordinate 
officers. He admitted the government ministers had not directed 
him to undertake active operations in Ulster but he--thinking there 
would be disturbances when the arms depots were reinforced--had 
directed his commanders to be ready for active operations.^
The opposition did not believe in Paget’s statement or in 
the completeness of the white paper. The Tories subjected Asquith 
to savage cross-examination~~particularly about The Times statement 
on tVie limited fleet movements--now that the new white paper indi-
59Parliamentary Debates, 5th ser., Vol. 61 ( 1 4  Apr.-l May, 
1914), 578-579.
^°The Times (London), April 23, 1914, 6 .
61Ibid,
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- • 62cated far more extensive naval activity. Asquith presented a 
skillful explanation. He had given the First Lord of the Admir­
alty general permission to move a battle squadron from Arosa Bay 
to Lamlash on March 11. Churchill had acted on that permission 
without telling Asquith. When Asquith heard about the movement,
he ordered it cancelled. In view of the cancellation, the state-
63ment m  The Times was essentially correct.
The Ulster Unionist Council, a group that generally included 
the members of Carson’s provisional government, issued a statement 
on April 17 which included an account of P a g e t ’s conferences and 
proported to give the facts connected with the contemplated opera­
tions. The statement quoted expressions by Paget which indicated 
a definite intention to initiate active hostile action against 
Ulster., The plan of operation was linked with Churchill's Brad­
ford speech. Although it was not backed by any solid evidence,
this statement caused a sensation in the press; the government
64did not acknowledge or repudiate it. Colonel Replington, The
Times military expert, wrote that there was good reason to suspect
1
a plot. He could not believe the deployment of the military and 
naval units was arranged on mere verbal instructions.
62Parliamentary Debates, 5th ser., Vol. 61 (14 Apr.-l May, 
1914), 1550-1555.
63 . M ^  64 „ , . ,
Rvan, Mutiny, 169. Fergusson, Curragh Incident, 183.
^^The Times (London), April 27, 1914-, 5-6.
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On April 25, a huge shipment of arms and ammunition--24,600 
rifles and three million rounds--secretly purchased in Germany, was 
landed at L a r n e . ^  Units of the Ulster Volunteer Force were mobi­
lized to cover the landing of the smuggled arms. Communications
lines were cut between Larne and Bangor; police and customs of-
. ■ . 6 7facials were prevented from interfering with the.landing. There
was no longer any temptation to raid arms depots. Also gone was
the likelihood that the British Army could easily subdue the Ulster
Volunteer Force if a provisional government was established in
Ulster. The army was no longer a means of resolving the Irish
deadlock. Redmond and his Nationalists were beaten; Ulster would
6Rhave to be excluded from the Home Rule Bill. General Macready, 
supposedly in Belfast to organize the government effort, was called 
to London for new instructions. Asquith told him pot to interfere 
if fighting broke out; to remain on the defensive if the pro­
visional government was proclaimed; to leave the protection of 
Belfast in the hands of the Lord Mayor. Macready had a sardonic 
streak. "With these heroic instructions in my pocket," he writes,
"I returned to Belfast."^
On April 27 and 28, the opposition made one more attempt-- 
by offering a motion for an official inquiry into the alledged plot--
66Pall Mall Gazette (London), April 27, 1914, 1.
67K e e , Green Flag. 489.
68Ibid., 489-490.
69Macready, Annals, 191.
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to discredit the government. This move caused Winston Churchill 
to "put up his h a c k l e s H e  began with a stinging attack on the 
Tory methods and ended with a tenative offering of the olive branch:
What we are now witnessing in the House is uncommonly 
like a vote of censure by the criminal classes on the police,
. . . The Conservative Party, the party of the comfortable,
the wealthy, the party of those who have the most to gain by 
the continuance of the existing social order, here they are 
committed to naked revolution, committed to a policy of armed 
violence, and utter defiance of lawfully constituted authority, 
committed to tampering with the discipline of the army and 
navy, . . » committed to smuggling in arms, by moonlight, com­
mitted to the piratical seizure of ships, and to the unlawful 
imprisonment of the king's servants,--the Conservative Party 
as a whole committed to that.7^
Continuing on a different tack, Churchill discussed the possible
effect of certain Tory tenets:
« . . Take his doctrine in regard to the Army--his
doctrine of what the officers are entitled to choose or not 
to choose. He was obliged to carry that further, and say 
that men might choose also. I am not going to push the 
matter too far, but consider the application of that doctrine 
to the native officers of the Indian Army, or to the native 
soldiers of the Indian or Egyptian Army, and you will see 
that, in his insatiable hunger to get into office he is 
subverting principles which are absolutely vital to the con­
tinued organized government of the British Empire.7'*’
He raised an interesting security problem:
I am certainly not going into details of confidential 
discussions which were held with Sir Arthur Paget and other 
generals. . . .  I think it is a very cool request on the 
part of gentlemen engaged in planning military operations 
against the organized government of the King--on the part 
of gentlemen engaged in arming, as they tell us, a hundred 
thousand men with rifles and ammunition, to shoot down the
70Parliamontary Debates, 5th ser., Vol. 61 (14 Apr.-l May, 
1914), 1575-1577. —
71Ibid., 1578.
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K i n g Ts servants--! think it is a very cool request that they 
should come forward and ask to be informed what are the precise 
military or police measures that will be adopted against them. 
Therefore I have not the slightest intention of going into any 
of those confidential m a t t e r s . ^
The irresponsible actions of the opposition were cited:
All this talk of civil war has not come from us; it 
has come from you. For the last two years, we have been forced 
to listen to a drone of threats of civil war with the most 
blood-curdling accompaniments and consequences. What did 
they mean by civil war? Did they really think that if a civil
war came, it was to be a war in which only one side was to
take action? Did they really believe it was all going to be 
dashing exploits and brilliant gun-running coups on the side 
of rebellion and nothing but fiendish plots on the part of
the government?. . . I wish to make it perfectly clear that
if rebellion comes, we shall put it down, and if it comes 
to civil war, we shall do our best to conquer in the civil war. 
But there will be neither rebellion nor civil war unless it 
is of your makinq,73
Churchill finished with a dramatic appeal to Carson:
The right hon, Gentleman, the member for the University of 
Dublin {Carsonj is running great risks--no one can deny it-- 
in strife. Why will he not run some risk for peace? The key 
is in his hands now. . . . Why cannot the rt . hon. and learned
gentleman say boldly, "Give me the amendment to the Home Rule 
Bill which I ask for, to safeguard the dignity and the inter­
ests of Protestant Ulster, and in return I will use all my in­
fluence and good will to make Ireland an integral unit in a 
federal system.". . . If such language were used, I firmly
believe that all that procession of hideous and hateful moves 
and counter-moves that we have been discussing and are now 
forced to discuss, and that hateful avenue down which we 
have looked too long, would give place to a clear and bright 
prospect.7^
It was beautiful oratory even if it did not answer any of 
the specific questions put by the opposition. Balfour remarked that
72Parliamentary Debates, 5th ser., Vol. 61 (14 Apr.-l May, 
1914), 1585-1586.
73Ibid., 1589-1590. 74Ibld., 1590-1592.
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Churchill, asked to reply in detail to specific charges, had pro­
vided, the House with "an outburst of demogogic rhetoric." Seely, 
emboldened by Churchill, discussed PagetTs promised reinforcements: 
"If I am accused of a plot, I go further, and on my own responsi­
bility I said [to Paget] , *Not only may you have forces to bring 
you up to any number of thousands you may require to maintain law 
and order, but you can have as many more as you find necessary, even
7 C
to the last man." Asquith backed his ministers all the way.
The Prime Minister maintained the actions taken were adequate and
proper precautions; he called the alleged plot a "mare's nest."
76The motion for the inquiry was put and rejected. But still there 
was no compromise on the Home Rule Bill.
Search for Compromise 
May, June and July of 1914 were months of decreasing ten­
sion on the Home Rule problem and increasing tension in European 
capitals. If the British Army was not going to enforce the Home 
Rule Bill in Ulster, the only solution appeared to be exclusion. 
Asquith was now privately convinced some parts of Ulster would have 
to be excluded. An Amending Bill was introduced in the House of 
Lords to allow any Ulster county to vote for exclusion for six years. 
In committee the Lords further modified the Amending Bill to allow
75Parliamentary Debates, 5th ser., Vol. 61 (14 Apr.-l May, 
1914), 1589-1590.
Ryan, Mutiny, 190.
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the permanent exclusion of Ulster by plebiscite* This was accept­
able to Carson and Bonar Law but Redmond would not recognize this
solution. He still hoped, unrealistically, to achieve a united
77 «and Home Rule Ireland. The Home Rule Bill, protected by the
Parliament Act of 1911, was ready for Royal Assent without amend­
ment, but Asquith delayed final action and began,- at the K i n g rs
78urging, further negotiations with Bonar Law and Carson. It was 
during these efforts at compromise that the news arrived of the 
assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand at Serajevo on June 28.
Major-General Wilson continued his seditious ways becoming, 
if anything, bolder. In a conference with Lord Milner, Wilson 
agreed that, unless Asquith agreed to the L o r d s 1 exclusion amend­
ment (and both Wilson and Milner were certain Redmond would not 
allow this), Carson should establish his provisional government and 
take over as many government offices as he could short of bloodshed 
(Wilson may have known about the instructions to Macready). Milner 
wanted to know what the army would do when the provisional govern­
ment was proclaimed. Wilson answered, MI thought that if Carson
and his government were sitting in City Hall, and we were ordered
79down to close the hall, we would not go." Douglas and Sclater, 
according to Wilson, also said they had no intention of moving into
OQ
Ulster "except in the ordinary way of quelling riots.11
77 78
Asquith, Fifty Years, 172. Jenkins, Asquith, 318.
79Callwell, Wilson, 148. 80Ibid.
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By mid-July all parties, even Redmond, saw the urgent need
for an understanding. Regardless of majority decisions, partition
was inevitable, and detailed negotiations and geographic decisions
81were necessary. All sides accepted the K i n g ’s invitation to a 
conference at Buckingham Palace on July 21. Asquith and Lloyd 
George represented the government; Bonar Law and Lord Landsdown, 
the Conservatives; Redmond and Dillon, the Nationalists; Carson
QO
and Craig, the Ulster Unionists, The conference came to nothing;
it broke down on the boundaries of Fermanagh and Tyrone. The events 
at the Curragh, in Ulster and in the House of Commons were not 
enough to shock the politicians into unity. Civil war in Ireland
83seemed inevitable. "An all-sufficient shock was, however, at hand.” 
Churchill was disgusted. The disposition of Tyrone might be worth 
a war to the Irish but was certainly not worth a war to forty million 
British. War came from another direction. On July 25, as "the
cabinet toiled in the muddy byways of Fermanagh and Tyrone," Sir
. . 8 4Edward Grey interrupted to read the Austrian ultimatum to Servia.
World War I buried the Home Rule Bill. Carson put his
Volunteers at the disposal of the government. Redmond asserted the
Irish could defend their own coasts; releasing British troops to
81Cameron, 1914, 26-27„
82Churchill, Churchill, 487.
8 3Churchill, Crisi s , 100.
84Churehill, Churchill, 488-489.
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the continent. The Home Rule Bill did receive Royal Assent on
September 18, 1914, but its implementation was suspended until after
the war. In the House of Commons, Will Crooks called out, "God
86
save Ireland!" Redmond replied, "God save England!"
^Parliamentary Debates, 5th ser., Vol. 65 (20 Jul.,-10 Aug., 
1914), 1829.
O ^
Pall Mall Gazette (London), September 18, 1914, 1.
CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS
Plot
Did a plot exist? Did the government, or individuals 
within the government, conspire to provoke Ulster to armed re­
sistance against British authority, thereby giving the government 
the excuse to use massive power to put down resistance and impose 
the Home Rule Bill on Ulster by force of arms? Insufficient his­
torical evidence precludes positive determination of the presence
or absence of a plot. The fact that Lieutenant-General Paget was
v
given no written orders, beyond the directive of March 14-, 1914-, 
can be used to sustain either view. It can be argued that he re­
ceived no written orders so the secrecy of the plot could be pre­
served, or that he received no written orders because there was 
no plot. The cabinet committee, that caused the pertinent verbal 
orders to be issued to Paget, was formed by the Prime Minister in 
response to cited police reports from Ireland; reports that the 
Ulsterites might attack government arms depots. The government
never produced these reports and the question of their existence
2
was raised by the opposition. Publication of these reports would 
have helped the government cause.
3 2Supra, 61,. Supra, 99 , 101.
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Unfortunately for the historian, men do not always have a 
rational basis for their actions, but it is difficult to find a 
sound reason for the Ulster Volunteer Force to have attacked the 
government arms depots. The Ulsterites wanted to avoid a confron­
tation with British regular forces. If Ulster was to fight, they 
vjant.ed to fight an at'tempt by Southern Irishmen to enforce the 
decrees of a Home Rule Parliament controlled by Catholics. British 
soldiers would be resisted only if they attempted to support the 
Irish Parliament against the provisional government of Ulster. The 
Ulsterites had no pressing need for arms. Arms were on the way;
the planning and execution of the Larne smuggling operation took 
3
many months. Thus there were no apparent advantages to the Ulster
provisionals in attacking the government arms depots; there were
apparent disadvantages. As Churchill said at Bradford, if British
soldiers were killed by Ulstermen, vast numbers of Englishmen would
4turn against the Ulster cause. The possibility existed that some 
radical guerrilla bands of Ulsterites, not affiliated with the 
provisional government, might have tried an attack on an arms depot, 
but the provisional government of Ulster--mindful of the need for 
continued English support--would have been more interested in stop­
ping such an attack than the imperial government at Westminster.
The police reports, if they did exist, probably lacked validity.
3Supra, 104. Covin, Carson, 362, et seq.
4Supra, 52.
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What, exactly, was the British government facing in Ulster?
A provisional government had been formed; a volunteer army organ­
ized. Led by able and determined politicians, this group intended 
to resist being seperated from the imperial government. They were 
determined to resist seperation by political action and to resist, 
by force of arms if necessary, subservience to the Irish Parliament 
as constituted by the Home Rule Bill."* The threat of the Ulster­
ites to resort to violent action was not directed against Great 
Britain but against their fellow islanders. The British government 
has an obligation to keep the peace and enforce the law--which would 
soon include the Home Rule Bill. Ulster, the threats of the Con-
I
servative and Unionist politicians notwithstanding, would probably
l i
not have resisted, by force of arms, the presence o f  the British
; *
Army In Ulster to enforce the law. The trouble would become serious
6 !..!
after the British Army departed. Yet the army could not remain in 
Ulster indefinitely. An Irish Parliament in Dublin, dominated by 
Southern Irishmen, would cite the continued presence of the British 
Army in Ulster as a tacit government effort to exclude Ulster from
7
the operation of the Home Rule Bill. Unless the Asquith government 
were prepared to "put these grave matters to the proof," they would 
be compelled to modify the Home Rule legislation.
5
Blake, Bonar L a w , 207.
^Jenkins, Asquith, 284.
/Fitzgibbon, Lion 1 s P a w , 43.
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Would Redmond and his Nationalists have accepted a major 
modification to the Home Rule Bill which allowed the Ulster count­
ies to be excluded by majority plebiscite? Probably not; by
I
doing so the Nationalists would have lost creditability among their 
8constituents* But the Irish Nationalists would have been unable 
to block such an amendment if the Liberals had joined the Conserva­
tives and Unionists in voting for it. If a Home Rule Bill, so 
amended, became a statute, the Nationalists would surely have re­
signed themselves to accepting the modicum of self-government offered 
by such a law, even with Ulster's exclusion. Such was the choice 
of the British Liberal government: Assist the Southern Irish by
forcing Ulster to accept Home Rule or exclude Ulster and limit Home 
Rule to the consenting counties of the South and West of Ireland.^
The British government was, as yet, unwilling, in March,
1914, to deprive their political allies, the Irish Nationalists, 
of the opportunity for insular unity. The Ulster Unionists, whose 
fear of "Rome" rule was genuine if unrealistic, felt they were 
about to be abandoned by their country and so established the pro­
visional government and the Ulster Volunteer Force. The Ulsterites 
did not organize to fight the British government. Rather, they 
formed military organizations because they were about to lose the 
protection of the government at Westminster. Asquith saw this with
9Supra, 2 2 .
9 Supra, 1.0.7, 108.
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some clarity. When warned by the King that many officers would 
resign their commissions rather than fight in Ulster, the Prime 
Minister asked, "Who are they going to fight?""^ A good question; 
General Paget should have considered it.
Police reports aside, what would have been the motivation 
for the cabinet committee to provoke Ulster into a fight? A fear 
of insurrection might have justified increased security but was no 
reason for a provocative act. If the committee expected Carson to
4
proclaim the provisional government (This was not likely; Carson
had repeatedly said the provisional government would be proclaimed
11 • only when the Home Rule Bill became law.) and they were planning
to put it down, surely they would have alerted reinforcements or
3 2even declared a partial mobilization. They did neither. There
was no evident rational basis for the government ministers to seek
a confrontationWith the Ulster Volunteer Force.
If arms depot security was, in fact, the real motivation
for the orders to Sir Arthur Paget, what was the source of P a g e t ’s
statements, in his meetings with his generals and the 3rd Cavalry
Brigade officers, concerning "active operations in Ulster" and "in
13a blaze by Saturday?" P aget’s own mind, rather than committee
■^Nicholson, George V , 233.
11Supra, 8 .
Supra, 56. Fergusson, Curragh Incident, 179.
] q
Supra, 63.. ' . '
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instructionss may have generated such phraseology. Paget was not
given to understatement; he may have been subject to delusions of
l<i
power and grandeur. ‘ The very lack of coherence that all noted 
in his statements argues against a plot; plots require careful 
structuring.
The opposition politicians and press were convinced of the 
existence of a plot to provoke an incident in which Unionists would 
a.ttack British soldiers. The attack, they said, would be the occa­
sion for large military and naval units to move into Ulster, destroy 
the Ulster Volunteer Force, arrest the provisional government lead­
ers and place Ulster under martial law. According to the Conserva­
tives and Unionists, -the evacuation of Victoria Barracks, the for­
mation of a "ring of steel" around Belfast, plus plans for naval 
shelling and massive reinforcements from Scotland and England, were 
all parts of a diabolical government plot. The a i m  of the plot, 
it was alleged, was to reduce Ulster to a state of docility that
would make the country amenable to parliamentary control by Southern
?
15Irishmen under the terms of the Home Rule Bill.
The evidence is too sketchy and contradictory to support 
the idea of a plot. Churchill was certainly planning to assemble 
a massive naval force off Belfast Lough. He may have sincerely b e ­
lieved in the possibility of the mobilization of the Ulster Volunteer 
Force and have been concerned about the preparedness of the navy.
14Supra, 63-..
*^Covin, Carson, 331-332.
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This would have been an excusable concern for a young First Lord 
of the Admiralty« No evidence has been discovered, however, that 
he connived in provoking an Ulsterite a t t a c k . C o l o n e l  Seely, the 
War Secretary, disregarded Paget's recommendations against iruup 
movements and ordered the reinforcement of the arms depots in Ulster 
that formed a skeletal ring around Belfast. These arrangements, 
however, would have been inadequate to cope with a mobilized Ulster 
Volunteer Force operating on interior lines. Sir John French 
ridiculed the scattering of the British troops which he felt was
an incorrect disposition of forces for the suppression of trouble
17 •in Ulster. Paget was evidently promised large reinforcements if
he needed them but the Aldershot Command, the only ready source of
1 8reinforcements, was never alerted for operations in Ireland.
Paget may have expected, in view of Brigadier-General Gleichen's 
reports and because of his own intuition, that the Ulsterites would 
resist the troop movements; hence "active operations in Ulster" 
and "in a blaze by Saturday." All who heard him agree, moreover, 
that General Paget insisted that aggression begin with the Ulster­
ites; under no circumstances would the army begin the fighting.
Fire would not be returned until all efforts for a parley had been
19 . . . .exhausted. These instructions cannot be reconciled with opposition
16
Churchill, Churchill, 482.
17Supra, 56 .
18Fergusson, Curragh Incident, 179.
1 QSupra, 63.
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assertion that part of the government plot was to persuade Paget,
with only unwritten orders, to provoke an incident and lead a div-
20ision-sized invasion of Ulster. Paget's mere presence at the 
hub of the action dilutes the strength of the plot allegation. 
Serious plotters would have picked a better man. Neither the evi­
dence or the motivation for a plot is substantial enough to be 
convincing.
Mutiny
If there was no plot, was there a mutiny? Brigadier-General
Gough, in his autobiography, contends he was not guilty of mutiny.
Given a choice between active operations in Ulster and dismissal,
he chose dismissal and, by example if not by words, influenced his
brigade officers to resign with him. Gough asserts that, if he
21had been ordered north, he would have obeyed without question.
He was given an option not to obey and he took it. Gough, however, 
knew he should never have been given such an option. He may have 
chosen dismissal simply because he was angered by P a get’s threats-- 
and later was too proud to admit he had made a rash decision. The 
cavalry general records that Irish politics did not particularly 
interest him, yet, in spite of this, he used every leverage to ex­
tract a promise from the government not to enforce a political de-
22cision m  Ulster. Why? Perhaps he could not resist the frivolous
^ Gupra, 103;, IQ6. ^ G o u g h ,  Soldiering, 99.
^ I b i d . , 98 .
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indulgence of his own ego when he saw the embarassment of his
. 2 3military and political superiors.
Gough was an extremely suspicious man. He admittedly dis-
24
trusted Churchill, Seely, French, Macready and Paget. The cav­
alry leader attributes his intransigence at the War Office to his
resentment over ” the Army . . . being made a pawn' in the political
25game.” Gough would not accept that, within the limits of the 
constitution, the army was indeed a tool in the political game. 
Manipulating government policy does not fall within the survey of 
a cavalry brigade commander. Technically Gough was not a mutineer 
but neither was he an exemplary soldier. When Gough’s conduct is 
compared with Major-General Fergusson’s, no question remains as to 
which general acted in the best interests of his country.
v
General Paget’s action was--as Fouche said of the execution 
of the Due d ’Enghien--worse than a crime; it was a blunder. Pos­
sessed, or not, of secret unwritten orders, Paget played his hand 
poorly. He should never have confronted his officers with the 
ultimatum. Before the ultimatum was necessary, there should have 
been some resignations. Before there were any resignations, there
should have been some marching orders. Given marching orders without
27options, probably all officers would have obeyed.
23 24Supra, 83-84. .Gough, Soldiering, 106-122, passim.
25Ibid., 106. 26Supra, 69-70.
2^Gough, Soldiering, 99.
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Sir Henry Wilson was really a mutineer. He cannot be ex­
cused, whatever the depth of his political conviction, for engaging 
in intrigue to bring down the government under which he served; 
for subverting the army and giving aid to potential enemies--all 
while holding high military rank. Yet, for all his activity, 
Wilson’s actions had a limited effect on events. . His principal 
role was that of a disloyal errand boy carrying secrets to the 
opposition. He lacked the fortitude to lead a mutiny. While his 
Ulster sympathies did not seem to him a compelling reason for 
resigning his office, he did not hesitate to urge Sir John French
to resign. Although Wilson urged Sir Hubert Gough to "stand like 
28
a rock," Gough did not modify his conduct at the request of 
Wilson; the cavalry general acted on his own throughout the inci­
dent. Wilson did not case the Curragh Incident; Gough did. If
29
Gough had not chosen dismissal, there would have been no incident.
Wilson was a mutineer in his heart even if he shunned direct
action. He told Lord Milner, ". . . if . . . ordered . . . we will
30 • .
not go." But it can be predicted, with reasonable certainty, that
Sir Henry would get somebody else to make the first refusal.
World War I
The effects of the Curragh incident were to be felt in the 
early days of World War I . Liberal Party politicians and military
?8Supra, 93. 2 ^ Su p ra, ^4*
2^Supra,108. Callwell, Wilson, 148.
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leaders worked together in the opening months of that struggle in
an atmosphere of mutual suspicion. Mistrust clouded the liaison
31between soldiers and statesmen. Some officers feared that, since 
the army had won at the Curragh, the politicians might try to dis­
credit the army in France. Nothing of the kind materialized; peril 
generated unity. Time diluted most of the doubt brought about by 
the incident. Some abrasions remained. A strong dislike arose be ­
tween Sir John French, who became commander of the British Expedi­
tionary Force, and Sir Douglas Haig, the commander, under French,
^ T ^ 32 of I Corps.
Echoes of the Curragh incident may have extended into World 
War II. The relations between Wavell and Churchill indicate that 
the thread of suspicion might run from the Curragh in 1914 to the 
Middle East in 1940; from a disillusioned young major and a thwarted
First Lord to a reluctant Field-Marshall and an impatient Prime
. . 33Minister.
Ireland
The Conservative and Unionist Party responsibility for the 
crisis has already been mentioned but the Liberal ministers must bear 
a share of the onus for the situation. Majority rule may be a tenet
31 .
John Terraine, Douglas Haig, the Educated Soldier (London:
Hutchinson, 1963), 65.
~^Ibld., 79. Cameron, 1914, 90*
33Connell, Wavell, 254-255.
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of representative government but the continued existence of such a 
government depends on the acquiescense of the minority as well as 
the rule of the majority. While the majority may pass legislation 
that the minority regards as improper, a prudent majority will re­
frain from promulgating decrees that the minority regards as intol­
erable. In the Irish situation from 1912 to 1914, a diligent search 
for a solution less than intolerable to both the Irish Nationalists 
and the Ulster Unionists should have been a prime consideration of 
the British government. If the government and the opposition had 
begun to ’’toil in the muddy byways of Fermanagh and Tyrone" in 1912, 
a compromise, albeit improbable, might have been found. An honest,
though tardy, attempt at the Buckingham Palace Conference in 1914
. V  - 34came tantalizmgly close to such a solution.
Minorities can accept majority decisions in a politically 
balanced country because elections have a way of changing the roles. 
Yesterday’s minority becomes today’s majority and vice versa. Ire­
land had no such balance. The Protestant minority could never hope 
to achieve dominance or even parity with the Catholics. Yet the 
Protestants locked upon the possibility of Catholic political dom­
ination with a fear nurtured by almost four centuries of bitterness
and strife. Thus many Irish Protestants found the Home Rule Bill 
3 5intolerable.
34
Supra, 109.
J5Blake, Bonar Law, 208.
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